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Civil Liberties and the Dual l egacy of the Founding 
John \V. Compton 
In rhc area of civil Liberties, the American framers bequeathed a dual legacy. On 
the one hand, they authored and ratified constitutions wirh strikingly open-ended 
guarantees concerning the fm:dom of srccch, the freedom of religion, the right ro 
trial by jury, and various aspectS of criminal procedure. On the other hand, the 
same Americans who spoke of "inalienable" righrs endorsed a range of inherittd 
laws and customary practices char shar;>ly limired rhe practical consequences of 
these abstr:act guarantees. MOSt of the newly independent states enforced laws 
againsr blasphemy, for example, cvci as thdr conStirunons promised to respect 
the freedom of speech. Many scares also criminalized Sunday labor and barred 
non·Proresranrs from holding office, even as rheir constirutions prohibited 
religious establi>hments and promised to respect rhe freedom of religion. And 
virrually no one involved in the drafting of the state or federal constitutions 
believed rhat civil liberries provisions indicated any change in the legal status of 
slaves, women, or orher subordinate classes of Americans. 
There can he little doubt that the authors of Founding·~:ra rights provisions 
sincerely hoped ro protect citizens from the sons of abuS<.'S - from warrantless 
searches ro rhc forced quarrering of soldiers - thar had transformed the imperial 
ctisi< inro a revolution. Bur most of them were equally dcrermined to guard against 
the colla~ of customary forms of authority rhar they dttmed essential ro social 
stability. Thus, while civil liberties prinaplcs certainly playtd a a:nttal role in the 
American Revolution, it is noc at all dear mar chcy occupied a prccmincnr position 
in the constitutional order that emerged in its afterrnarh. Far from elevating civil 
liberties above inhcrittd forms of authority, the founding generation superimposed 
the former on rhc latrer, leaving it ro future generations to work out the precise 
nature of the re.ulting relationships. 
This chapter will argue that the framers' dual legacy in the arcd of civil 
liberties has cnst a long historical shadow. Since the early republic:, Americans 
have invoked consritutional civil liberties provisions to challenge cusromary 
forms of authority. Yet establishing theabstraer legitimacy ofone's claim- that 
it comporrs wirh a particular concepticon of religious liberty or the freedom of 
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..,-ch, for e"ample - has typically been insufficient to prevail in the courts: In 
,ddiuon, rights claimant:s have regularly ~n asked _w overcome a compenng 
•of normative commlhnenrs- ro federalism, ro patnarchal family relanons, to 
-1iglously inspiml social mores - thar give entrenched authority its own 
4iorinct claim to consrirutional kgitimacy. The mOSt obvious practical eff~t 
fl dus duality, particularly in the early ytars of the republic, was the frtquenr 
_.i,ordmation of civil liberties ro illiberal forms of authority. Yet even as 
illiberal aurhority structures bave eroded over time, the framers' dual lcgacy 
... conti nued ro shape constitutional d(velopmcnt in ways both subtle and 
pcofound. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that even as Americans have adopted ever more 
IXP"ll)ive conceptions of particular consritutional liberties, they have cominued 
iodisagrec, often bitterly, about precisely which forms of inherited auchority are so 
arbitrary or oppressive as to run afoul of rhcsc guarantees. 111ey have also 
disagreed, just as bitterly, over the srare's proper role in mitigating the social 
lllld polirictl effects of illiberal social authority. Should civil liberties provisions 
be ttgarckd as purely negative guarantees, offering prorcction against government 
.aion only, and thus not incompatible with MJCial arraogement:s that, 
while illiberal, arc nor clearly underpinned by official auchority? Alternatively, 
do Jl'>vernmcnr actors ha"" an affumatirc duty ro dismantle inherited social 
llNCIUttS char render civil liberties aU bur meanin8Jcss foc some citizens? And if 
u:h an obligation aists, how does one cakularc (and justify) the resulting 
tnidcoffs bctwttn liberty and equality? Lf consensus on these questions has 
provtd elusive, ir is ar least in part because the Constitution, owing to irs dual 
• ture, cannot settle the matter. 
This chapter divides the history of civil liberties into four periods. The first 
lection covers the period from the founding through the late nineteenth century - a 
cirnc when a broad moral consensus roote<I in Protestant Christianity was said to 
demarcate a bow1dary b<.-tween "liberty" and "license" and when open-ended civil 
liberties provisions were rarely interpreted in ways that undermined customary 
pettems of authority. The second section e>eamincs the early decades of the 
tMnticth century, a ttansforrnative period whci the collapse of the Proresrant 
moral consensus, together with the rise of social movement:s bent on undermining 
emrmched hierarchies, left the traditional 1hcory of ovil liberties in ratters. 
The chapter's third section documenrs rhe emergence, in the middle decades 
of the rwentieth century, of a new rhcory ccnrered on promoting individual 
eutonomy and protecting a robust marketplace of ideas. Crucially, the mid· 
century Supreme Court harnessed irs civil liberties jurisprudence to an 
eplnarian theory of American democracy, aggressively scrutinizing laws char 
appeared ro perpetuate systemic incqu:.tllty while adoptirtg a defe-rt"nri:il 
epproach in cases where state action seemed designed to mitigate flaws in the 
nation's rcprcsenrative system of government. 
The chapter's final section covers rhe modern period (1970s to the present}, an 
m when the justices have sorted themselves into competing ideological <"'1mps, 
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with each camp at times embracing an expansive conception of civil liberties _ 
albeit for ve.ry different reasons .. fo son:ic ~-ascs, a "liberal" bloc advocating an 
uncom~rom1smg approach to ovil hberues 1s pitted against a "conservative" bloc 
advocating ~eferencc to trad'.ti?n~l m~res.and local majority sentiment. In others, 
the ideological valence of ovd liberties 1s reversed, with the conservative bloc 
adopon~ an absolutJSt conception of individual rights and rhe libeml bloc 
advocating defer~ce to lawmakers who arc purportedly acting to remedy 
structural mcquaht1es. llec;i use case outcomes have often turned on the vote of a 
~ingle "swing". jw:rkc, m~c':" civil liberties doetrine has grown increasingly 
incoherenr: decisions procl:ummg the inviolabiliiy of civil liberties principles are 
followed, often ID the same term, by decisions calling for deference to tradition or 
for suhordi~ating ci~il liberties to the goal of fostering a more egalitarian society. 
These doctrinal tensions become comprehensible when viewed in the light of the 
framers' dual legacy. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE LONG NINt.Tt.~NTH CENTURY 
Ar first glance, it may seem that the individual righ ts today referred to a~ "civil 
liberties" have always been a core concern - perhaps the core concern - of 
~crican.con~titutionalism. Certainly, no subjcct featured more prominend y 
ID the ~anficanon debate of 1787-1788.' Most of the delegates rasked with 
evaluanng the Philadelphia Convention's handiwork hailed from states whose 
c~nstin~tions recognized a range of "natural," "inalienable," or "inherent"' 
rights, m~ludin~ the freedom of the press, the freedom of religion, and the 
right to tnal by JUI)'. The biU (or declaration) of rights was typically placed at 
the head of t.hese documenrs, thus ensuring, at least in theory, that the new state 
governments would not '?~ sight of the higher ends for which they were 
formed. Tr is hardly surprismg, then, that many delegates cried foul when it 
was dlSCovcrcd that the proposed federal constitution lacked such protections. 
In the end, James Madison and other leading Federalists fearing that the 
Constitution might go down to defeat, agreed to amend che document. The 
resulrmg guarantees, now known collectively as the Bill of Rights, included 
the freedoms ~(.press and speech; the rights of petition a nd assembly; the free 
exercise of relig1.on.; a ban on religious establishments; the right to bear arms; 
and a range .of crrmmal procedure guarantees including, among other things, the 
right to: fair and speedy trial, a ban on warrandess searches, and a prohibition 
aga1Dst cruel and unusua l" pu~ishmenrs. 
But for all the ink they spilled in defense of civil liberties it is far from dear 
that founding-era America.ns understood these guarantees in the same way as 
twenty-first-century Americans. Indeed, many of the same state convenrion 
dclegares who demanded a federal bill of righrs were alarmed to find that the 
1 
See, for example. PauUoe Maier, Ra#/icatfon: Tht Pimple Debate tllt Constilulion, J ?87-J 7gg {New York: Simon and Schus1er, 1010). 
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Con.iirution explicitly banned the use of religious test oaths for 
al officeholders. This provision raised the specter that "pagans, deists, 
ometaos" and even the "fX>pe of Rome" might "obtain offices among 
,._ • • Although Federalist writers conceded chc force of the objection, rhey 
J-hed to assure skeptical dcleg;itcs that rhe Constitution would not interfere Jllilb the stateo' ability to punish "profane swearing, blasphemy ... professed 
lllhcism • and other "gross immoralities and impieries. "' 
What should we make of A'!'cri<"allS who demanded expansively wordc-d rights 
puaoteeS while simultaneously insisting that \.atholics be barred from public 
dfices and blasphemy punished as a crime? Two broadly shared convictions 
llloMd Americans tO proclaim allegiance ro the idea of civil liberties while 
lialulraneously embrocing inherited social srn1erurcs that sharply limited the rcal-
world effects of these written guarantees. First, ir was widely agtCed that republican 
pemmcnt was unlikely to survive in the absence of a morally virtuous citizenry.• 
from this it followed that a Prorestant-derivcd moral consensus marked, or ought 
ID mark, ~ boundary between liberty and license. Second, e•en as Americans 
tailnced the 1..-JCkean language of natural rights, the enduring force of the 
cunmon law ensured that they would continue to view their own society in 
llroadly hierarchical t.erms. Thus James Kent and other early American legal 
_,,,.,.uarors depicted a society composed nor of coequal rights-bearing citizens 
bur of legally enforceable relationships featuring dominant and subordinate 
panncrs: husbands and wives, masters and servants, guardfans and waids.1 To 
the limited extent that these writers addressed the tension between inherited legal 
prerogatives and rhc Lockean ideal of universal rights, they insisted that the very 
poliibiliry of republican government presumed a well-<>rdered society. And a weU-
...Xred society, in tum, presupposed the existcntt of hierarchically organized 
111bunirs, such as families and workplaces.• 
• Ntsl H. C.ogan, ed., l'he Complete B;J/ of Rights: The Dr1JflS, Vebates~ Snuret1, and Origins (New 
York: Oxford Unh·ersity Pres~ 1997), 6.h 67. Thie quotacions arc from the Non:h Carolina 
nnfymg con""''°"· 
' Obm Ellswonh. "/\ l.andholckr, No. 7." In Cog.n, td., TM C.0...pl•tt Bill of Rlglm, 78. 
• Ah:hougb. James M;id1wn arguably bt.hcvcd that a well'"<lcsigncd constttu11on01I $f$tem could 
rhn't't e'len in lhc 01bM::nce of virruousofticeholders, (ew o(h1s contemporaries seem ro have shared 
rhi• convforion. Nor is it tiuirely clear rhat Madison hdd the amoral view o( po1iric3I r.oc.;cty that 
•often attribured io him. Stt., fof' example, Lanct &nning. Tbe Sacrtd ,.,,.~of U~rty: jamu 
"""-'i and th< Foi.ndmg of U.. Fnlu•I RtP..b/u: (Ithaca: Com<lJ UnMt$1ty Pr<SS, t 998), 4 7. 
1 Jama Kent, C.onmirntanes on Amrnu11 Low, Vol. 1. (N<W Yock: 0. Halstad,. 1827). 
• AA Wilham Novak hou: put the potnr, the particular bundle o( rights to which a ninetecn:th-ttncury 
American could lay <.la11n W<l" "'highly patticulari1.cd lanJJ t.kpend<'RI upon lanl individual's 
ptraonal pattern of residence. juriMikdon, office. juh, tiervk't, organi1.1trion1 :bsociacton. fomily 
J)Oliuoo, age, 1tender, race. and c:apadty. • "'The Legal Traosform1rion of Cir.iunship in 
N1nnttnth.C.U1wy America,• in _\1ta Jacobs, WillU.m J. Novak. •nd Jtilian E. al12<r, «!.., 
l1w IHmoero.tie l:.xpnmtn11: New DirtalOM m Amnlt.an Pol1t1cal Hut0ty(Pnooeloo: Princeton 
lhuvc:rsny Press., 1009), 85-119, 95. Set al50, Williamj. Nonie, Thi' P«Jpl.t'1 Wtlfare: Law and 
ltlplation in Nmelttmtb-Cenlury Amnic.a (Chapel Hill: University o( Norlh Carolin3 PrciS, 
19~6). 
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To see this morali1,ed and pariiculnrized conception of rights in action, we need 
only examine a few illustrative cases involving religious liberty and the freedom <)f 
the press. Consider the case of john Ruggle.,,, a resident of New York who in 18u 
appealed his blasphemy conviction to his •tatc'• highest court. At first glaoce, 
Ruggles had a strong case. He pointed out that New York's coostitution 
guar.uueed the freedom of conscience and barred the establishment of an official 
religion. Moreover, bla>phcmy was not explicitly mentioned as a criminal act in 
any Statute enacred by the state legislature. And yL'f Judge James Kenc, in the face of 
these apparently mirig.1ring facts, affirmed Rugglc.'s conviction. Although Kent 
acknowledged that New Yorlc had "discarded religious establishments,• he 
insisred that it had not repealed rhose pam of the common law that served to 
"inculcate moral discipline" and "bind society together. "7 Blasphemy would 
conrinue to be punished as a crime in New York not because it offended "the 
rights of the church• but because it "tcnd[ed] to corrupt the morals of the people, 
aod to destroy (the) good order" that was the esseotial prttcquisite of republican 
government.* 
If the rights of conscience belonged in the first instance to Protestant Christians, 
the duties that corresponded to these rightl> fell disproportionately on nonbelievers 
aod religious minorities. This was nowhere more evident than in early appellate 
cases involving Sunday labor. In Commonwealth v. Wo/f (1817), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court dismissed a Jewish tradesman's constitutional objections to a state 
law that criminaliud nonessential labor on the Christian Sabbath. Although the 
state's constitution guaranteed the free exercise of religion, the Court reasoned that 
Wolfs rights had not bL-cn infringed, since nothing in (its reading of) the Jewish 
sacred texrs commanded Jew;, to labor on Sundays. Wolf was free to forego labor 
on Saturdays, but rhe srnrc constitution did not guarantee his right to make up for 
lost time hy working on the day when "the great mass" of the state's citizens 
believed God had commanded them to rcst.9 An 1886 dcx:ision of the Georgia 
Supreme Court employed the s.imc line of reasoning, noting that prntcttions for 
religious liberry would be but "paper guarantees, unless protected and enfore<!<l hy 
legal sanction•," including Sunday closing laws, that ensured a quiet and 
wholesome environment for "religious worship.'"0 
7 People v. Rugg.lei, 8 John~. 190. 196, 194 (• 81 1 }. Mosl ea.rl)' Amt":rican rommcntators acapred 
John L.ockt'.s •rtturflt'ru that S«ular authot1t1C$, whose primary m-ponsibility was to safeguard 
ciri1.cn.s· fibtny and proptny, hid no bus1nw either pracribmg or proscribin,; particular artides 
of &irh Of" forms of worship. 1nn conctprioo m.arke!d • ~•g.mhcao1 bttak with English pracricc in 
that it genera Hy barttd I~ succ from pcn«-1.1t1ng Ctb.un~ whose ooly crlOle was lO bdong roan 
unpopubir "Ca~ Y~ as IC.mi's R."JCJ."'"' op1n.un m.aka dear, mos' Judges wttt noncthdcss 
~-upportivc of laws 11\a1 cuhi"attd rnpo."C for rdigmn (read: Proccs:caot Christiani1y) in tM 
absinct. For Lnckc'• con«p11on ol ttlW""' hbcny,..., •A l<=< Cona:rrung Toleration," in 
bn Shapiro, ed., T"'° r,,.,..., of Ciowrrmtbtt onJ a I.Itta C-ummg Tokration (~''" 
Haven: Yak Univ0"5iry P'rni.. a.oo3). i. t r-s6. 
'8Johos (N.Y.) 190 (•lu). • J SnJ. & 1Uwlq8; 1817 P•. LEXIS •o•• p. 
'
0 Thc:Trustttsol1hr Fini Mnhodm Fprte0p0I Oumh.South •• Thc:Ciiyoi Ad•nci, 76 Ca.181, 
191, .,.~J (188&). 
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·tar assumptions govcmcd early interpretations of constitutional free 1 
provisio11s. Most co'."mcntators agrL-ed :ha~ the commo.n law definition 
{lecdom of the press, which barred only the pnor restramt of ~peech, was 
·cnrly protective of individual libcrry. And many were also cnncal of the 
doctrine of seditious libel, under which virtually any speaker who 
a government official in print could be prosecuted, so long as the 
1Cted after the offensive material was published.'' By the early nineteenth 
ry, mosr of rhc States had formally declared - whether by ~nstitutional 
mcnt, judicial decision, or Stlltute- that speakers who, 111the1udgrnenr of a 
Jlr7• published factual information with up>tinding motives would be guilty of 
-~~as antebellum Americans enthusiastically exercised the right to criticiu 
iliteh<>lders, they s=dfasrly resisted aoy ~estion that tlUs newfound.~ 
....,iicd a brooder right to challenge the lcginmacy of eottcnched authonry 111 the 
or "domestic" sphere. This much bc:crum clear in the m1d-183os, when 
Cr Andrew Jackson authorized US postmasrus to destroy the antislavery 
11erature that Northtm abolitioniSl» had recently begun mail.ing to Southern 
~· '> Jack>on's Postmaster General, Amos Kendall,. ~t further, .llfl:i?s 
loulhcrn stares to enact their own laws to prevent the dissenunanon of abolinomst 
llla'atute. According ro Kendall, neither the first Amendment nor any other 
pnwision of the Constitution had di>'tllrbcd the slave states' right to ." fence and 
plllUCI their interest in slaves by such laws and regula11ons as, in the1r sovereign 
will, they may deem expedient.",. 
Chief Junice Roger Taney's majority opinion in the •857 Dred Scott Case 
.,.scJ any remaining doubt that the scope of constitutional speech rights was 
determined by an individual's position in a broader matt ix of legally enforceable 
tnrcrpcrsonal relationships. Although the case primarily conccmed the legal 
11atus of chattel slavery in the territories, Taney wenr out of he~ way to declare 
that even free blacks were excludl-<l from the privikgc'S and immunities of 
11 Writing in 1789, Thom" Jc:ffcr11on exprmcd hopt thar Americans would •nor be deprived. or 1brid~cd of 1ht1r righr m speak, co write. or uthetw1se ro publi.sh any thing but fa~ facts 
afkctmk injuriously the life, property or reputation of olhcn or a.fftcting rhc puce of the 
confederacy with foreign natlOns. • Thomu Jefferson ro James Madison, August i_8, t 789. ln 
Nt•I H. Cogan, td., Th< Comp/tu 8>11 of ll1gh1" Th< D.afu, D.baus. So•ras, and Origim, wd 
ed. (Ntw Yori<: Oxford Uruvtn1ty Pre:>., 101 s>. 181. 
•• far the most 1nAucnri1l naccmtnr of thu nde, 5CC Judge James Ken.r's opinion in Ptop~ v. 
Cm.well, J John<- Ca•. JJ7 (N.Y. •llo4). . 
" Ja.,.ic!iOn used hi1 18u Annu~I M~ to Congress to W'f¢ passage. of ·.such a. law as ~II 
prohibit, under scvett pmah,.., the cimdalion m the S..Utbttn StnCi ... ol inandiaty plbtica-
norb mtcndcd 10 in~u,ate the lb~ to iMUfKChon. • Stcpbto M. f.cklman, Frtt ExpresslOn and 
o,,.,««1cyn.,1.mmca:A Hr#"'7(CbJaao' UnrV<ni1yolOucago Pr...,"'°''' 130. 
.. M>o& quoi<d an M.:ha<I Kent Curo., fTtt Spttcb. "llH Ptoplc's Darlmg Pm'ikgc·: Stntgglcs 
for f'rffllom of Expr,,,_ >n Ammcan llr#<>ry (Durham, NC, OW.• Uru.....tty l'r.u, 
IOOO), lJI. 
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narional citizenship. To recognize free blacks as full citizens, Taney r=ned, 
would enrail rhe unimaginable consequence rhat 
prrsons o( the ncgro racet who were recognized a.s ciriuns 1n any one State or the Union, 
(would en1oy) 1he nght 10 enter every 01her St.ne whcne••cr 1hcy pleased ... and;, would 
g;ve tbtm tht ful/ l1berty of speech ;n pubUc and in pritldu upon oil subjects upon wb;ch 
fa Jtate's/ own atiuns might speak ... (and} 10 hold public mtttings upon polaical 
affairs ... And all of this would be done in the face of 1hc subject race of the same color ... 
and incvi~bly producing discontent and insubordinarinn among them, and endangering 
1he peace and safety of 1hc Sia<e." 
For Taney, it was simply "impossible ro believe" that che Southern framers 
"could have been so forgetful or regardless of cheir own safety" as to endorse 
the existence of rights whose contours were unaffected by their impact upon 
preexisring authority structures. ' 6 
One finds the same line of reasoning in countless ninctecnrh-ccntury cases where 
an asserted constitutional right of free speech collided with entrenched social 
hierarchies. Aurhority relations within the family, for example, remained largely 
unaffected by developments in the realm of constituriona I law. Women in the early 
republic were regularly prevented from speaking in public, particularly to mixed 
audiences. Sa11e and federal obscenity laws-known as Comstock Laws, afttt their 
chief proponent - barred discussion of comraceprion and fumily planning. And 
although women raise:<! constitutional objections to these restrictions (and many 
others), their picas typically fdl on deaf cars. As justice Joseph P. Bradley explained 
in r 873, in a case involving the Illinois s1a1e bar's refUS:tl 10 admit a woman, "the 
law of the Creator" had decreed char women were 10 enjoy only those rights that 
were essemial to " fulfill[ing] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."" 
Nor did civil liberties provisions significantly interfere with a111hority 
relations in the workplace. As nineteenth-century workers who invoked the 
frccdom of speech in defense of the right to organize quickly discovered, the 
legal prerogatives of the employer trumped - or rather defined the limits of -
the constitutional rights of the employee. ' 8 In some cases, employers and anti-
union officia ls suppressed labor organi2.ing by relying on ordinances that 
" 6o U.S. J9J, 416-1 7 (•8s7). 
1
' Ibid. ar .+ • 7· r,·m the moR n:phm coosrinmoo.al guannttn. such as Ilk fint Ammdmrnt right 
10 • pcm- 1he C'....-.mmcnr ft>< a redtUS of l!Jl<"IKH, • had bnl< p.-.cucal d!ttt wbm the 
sub;cn '"'I"<""'",.., sb•-.ry. In •836, rhe US Hou,. adopced 1 nil<- urfocmally known as 
the •pg rule" - that aurom•tically abkd all sbvccy-ttbred P<llllOOS. S.. Curus, htt S/>«<h: 
"The Ptopl.'1 O..rlmg PnV1kg<, • r38, 175- 81. 
" 8,.dwcll v. lll1noi<, 83 U.S. 130, 14i (<873). Br.rdlcy,J,.concurnna. 
'' Katrn Orrtn, 81/at~ Fr"'1alism: Labor., th~ Law, and [11Hral lHvtlopmmt m th1 U1uud States 
(New York: Cambr1dg1: University Pres~ t99t), 92. A" Orren purs the point, '1'be employee 
lived in a divided Polnical world. One St'<.'tiOn was governed hy puhftc reprcscnNtivcs of his own 
choosing., i1l rituals festooned and celebrated with the b:allyhoo or party politics, f!«>pled by 
silvcr·congucd oralors and war heroes. The other was sealed off from the public, disciplined and 
drab, irt governance located fin.ally in the somber and mystifying routines o( the courtroom.,. 
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~ucet speaking to certain (typically inconvenient) times and places. In 
they arrested organizers on vague charges that included vagrancy and 
mg the peace. But the most powerful tool in the anti-union arsenal was 
i.tior injunction: a court order rhat en1oined workers and organiurs from 
· ng, boycotting, or otherwise interfering with the operations of a 
· tar business. Although constitutional free spc«h provisions were 
;..rauy understood to bar "prior rcsrrainrs~ of speech, judges reasoned char Jidlor ,dcmonstr.ttions, b~ threa_tening the cmployer'.s property i_nterest in the 
,.-ccful operation of his busmess, crossed the lme that divided peaceful 
f!dY<>'•CY from ha rmful conduct.•• 
The Union victory in the Civil War is often described as marking a fundamental 
~ in American thinking about constirnrional rights. It is certainly true chat 
JJncoln and his fellow Republicans vehemently contested justice Taney's 
,..ertion that the preservation of slavery trumped all constitutional claims that 
,iight he asserted on behalf of free blacks or other residents of free states and 
.,ntories. Moreover, by the war's end, most northL-m An1ericans were convinced 
dilr chattel slavery was an affront to rhe ideals of libcrry and equality. And to 
~slavery's demise, all agreed, ir would he necessary to nationalize at I~~ 
IOIDt constitutional rights. Thus, the Fourteenth AmendmL"llt, adopced in 1868, 
_.t Congress and tbe couns with the formal authority to ensure tha1 no stare 
denied 1b residents equal protection of rhe laws; deprived them of life, liberty, or 
property without due process; or ~bridged the "privileges and immuni~" of US 
cilixns- But while tbe Rcconsrrucnon amendments granted a measure of liberty to 
die former slaves, they did not fundamcnrnlly airer the definition of liberty itsell. 
Indeed, many of rhe same commcnrators who denounced slavery as a moral 
evil remained steadfastly supporrive of the legally enforced hierarchies that 
ordered the home and the workplace. Many of tbem also envisioned a future 
In which African Americans and other racia l minorities would occupy a 
1Ubordinate position in society. And nearly everyone agreed that traditional 
andards of personal morality should continue co delimit the boundary 
between liberty and license. Thus, Thomas M. Cooley reminded readers of his 
influential Co11stitutiona/ Limitations that rhe right to publish true staremenrs 
concerning public affairs did not protect one who published a factually accurate 
account of a criminal trial where rhe sub1cet matter was "such as ro make ir 
improper that the proettdings should be spread before the public, because of 
their immoral tendency, or of the blasphemous or indecent character of the 
eYidcnce exhibited." Nor did religious liberty provisions proicet citizens who 
1
• Oa~1d M. Rab~ hu Spt-uh in Ju 1-orgorrm Y1ar1 (Ntw Y Qfic: Cambridge- Univcn:ity Press., 
1~97), 171-7~; t-eldm::1n, Fru &prt#ion "1ld DtmOC'faey i" A.mnic.a, :n.8-30. 135. As the 
Suprtmc Coun exphlincd in GompetS v. Ruclu Stove&. Range C"..o. (19u), printed nuterial 
backed by the threoar of union aaiviry acquired '"• force not inhering irt the words themselves, 
ind therefore exceeding any possible right of speech which n sing.le individual might ha~·t'. Under 
1uch clrcumsfanccs they beoome,, . verbal :acu, and ~s much subjn.'"t to injunction as the use of 
1ny other force whereby propeny is l.mlawfutly dam11gcd," u. 1 U.S. 418, 139 (19 1 t}. 
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dared to labor on rhc. Chrisrian Sabbath. Although Sunday labor bans were 
adm1rredly l~ss than fair to .J_ews, nothing in the Constitution barred lawmakers 
frnm. requmng that a certain amounr of "deference ... be paid ... to the . 
religious convicrions of the majoriry. " •0 • • 
THE BIRTH Of MODERN CIVIL LIBERTI ES, 1900-193; 
Thn>t: <l~v~lopme~rs p~~ed the way for.• fundamenrnl shift in Americans' thinking 
about CIVIi hbemes. fU"St, as the nanon grew more ethnically and rcligiousl d1~erse, an~ as urban clires grew increasingly slccprical of rustonwy mo,1; 
smcrures, II became ever more difficult to mainroin thar a brood moral 
consensus defined the boundary between liberty and license. Ar the same time 
acnv1st< from traditionally marginalized SC!,'lllents of American society began r~ 
c:!'3llenge. the kgm'.""cy nf ~nffl'11rh•.n hi,rorchi,.., •sgtts<ivel> •«crting novel 
ngt;irs da~ :>0th m the courrs and m the forum of public opinion. Finally, a 
ma1or ~mca. realignm~nt opened the h.1llsof power-and ultinutcly thecourrs -
to pm.:1sdy those Americans who had the mosr ro gain from a more expail~ive 
conception of civil liberties. 
. During th~ firsr three decades of the twentieth ocntury, internal divisions 
wtrhin American Prorcsr:antism gradually reduttd the liberty-license distinction 
to a shambles. Alth~ugh the split between modernists (er liberals) and 
fundamenrohsrs was msge~ by. th<'(>~ogical differences, it was exacerbated by 
d1sagreement!
1
over the smte ~role m.pol1cmg them.oral and religious convictions of 
the cmunry. Liberals, while nommally suppomvc of efforts ro cultivate public 
morahry, tended to adopt a dynamic view of morality and r:o oppose cnforcernrnt 
?f morals laws rhat appeared out of step with contemporary opinion and 
mtellecn'.al trt11ds.11 Fundamentalists, in contrast, favored vigorous lTiforcemenr 
of tradmonal moral and religious prerogatives. Thus, when fundamcnralL,'tli in 
Tennessee and elsewhere banned the reaching of evolution in public schools, liberal 
Prore=n.~ ~demne_d the laws as an affront to scientific inquiry and academic 
freedom. S11111larly, m •9)0, when the binh control advocate and sex educator 
Mary Ware Dennett was brought up on federal obscenity charges, mainline 
a.o Thoma~ M. Cooleyt A Trt".1tise on the Consmutiona/ Limitations wh;.ch Rt"s/ upon the 
~"'"'" P<N'<T of th< Swa of th• Ammca• U•ioo, sih ed. (Bo.too, Ude, Brown, t88)) 
SS4-.- JSH. ' 
u ~~ M. M.a~, hmdomknlalism and A"'tr•am CMltuu (New York-: Oxford Uruvtts.it) 
Pre~, 1oo6); D.iv1d A. HolltuKcr, t,(tn Clow,, Tongues of Fire: Pmtnr.anr 1,1/Hra/;sm in 
Modern Anrtmcan History (Prmcir:ton: Princcmn tJmvcrsiry Pms tOtj). 
u Oa mainline Protcst:!nr c_rirkism of traditional moral111 laws. see John W, Com pron, .. R'•ang.c:Jjcal 
Refonn and th< Parodn'""'11 Orogms of !he Righi to p,;,-3cy • Marykmd Lau, Rn.•tw 1 ( c j6l.41. • . s l.OT Si· 
'"' P. C. Ktmeny. ·~-er. Ridalt, and lM DmnaalOO ol Rdig.ious Moral Rtlorm Pol1tlC5 in cM 
'920S.. .. 111 .CfuiJtian S1:'1irh, ed., Tht St.cular RellOlulion: PctHT, fnterests. ind Confl1e1 in the 
Sect1lantat10n of Amem:an P11/Jfl(: /.,tfe (Berktley: University nf Cnlilornia Press, 1003): 11 6-68 ~~L > 
Liberties ar.d the Dual 1.egacy of the Fo11r1di11g 
nt groups including the Fcdctal Council of Churches and !he Young Men's 
Association (YMCA) leaped to her defense.'-< The debacle of national 
·non offered further evidence of a disinregraring moral consensus. Although 
Eighteenth Amendmem was generally welcomed in rural and small•town 
· , ir mer stiff resistance nor only from the nation's growing Irish and 
ethnic cor.ununitics but also from many well-heeled urban W ASJ>s, who 
by now aCC11>'tnmed to living without the moral supervision of their 
bors. 
Walter Lippmann providl.J a trenchant analysis of these developments in A 
'.a to Morals, one of the best-selling books of the !are 192.0s. Reflecting on 
,.eacs such as the Scopes Monkey Trial, the splintering of American 
Jrocestanrism, and the evident failure of prohibition, Lippmann concluded 
... , rhe "acids of modernity" had "dissolvc[ed)" the traditional belief systems 
9D which Americans had "habitually conformed." What was worse, it seemed 
lliP!Y unlikely tbat there would develop ·a new orthodoxy into which men can 
~t. • Whate•er boundaries might hcnceforrh be established to conmain 
ildividual liberty would not be based on custom or religion but rather on 
careful deliberation concerning the material needs of society. In the new age 
of moral relati vism and personal freedom, Lippmann concluded, i: had become 
•impossible for the moralist to command. He can only persuade. »s 
Ar the same time that the i111151on of moral consensus was crumbling, vanous 
poups of oursiders were beginning to detach rhe Constinition's civil liberties 
provisions from their rradicional moorings in cusrom and common law. 
lleimagined as abstract guarantees, civil liberties could be turne:I against the 
_,- social struaurcs that had long been rhoughr to mark the outer limits of 
illldiY1dual libert) in a republican society.Jews and Catholics, for example, bqµn 
IO use constitutional arguments to oppose Protestant prosclyti1jng in the public 
llChools. In several states, elected officials responded by d irl'<.'ting public funds to 
perochial schools, thus implicitly endorsing the right of Catholic children to 
nai>'C a publicly funded education that did not conflict wirh the reners of their 
flith."' Morcovtt, five state judJciaries - most of them in states with signi/icant 
C.ul1vli< popula1iono - had by 19~0 declared thot Prorest:int Bible readjng in the 
public schools amounted to an unconstirutiona l establishment of religion.•7 
.. By !hos poun, th<tc p1Jlan of !ht Prot.-..ant csublishmen1 had condud<d tlu1 socnrilially bued 
M:X tdl.Kanon, rather than blattktt et:n!Orship, provl<kd the surest rourt 10 a fn(ll21Jy upstaodmg 
atm::nry. Con5tt."ttt M. Chen, -Th. .Wx Side ofllf6•: Mary Ware INnNtt•s tsoneering &tdt 
for 8trth Control 1md Sex Edu<.11rion {Ntw York: The New Pr~ss., '''ti). i.99. Denocrt's 
4"11.mvKtion was t'vcmually overrurncd in a fandm:irk federal coun n1lin,g that substantially 
ELlrTOYi'ed the dd:n.itioo of obscenity undtr federal law. U.S. v. Denn(«, j9 F.id 564 ( rg30}. 
•• WUkr Lippman.a. A PrefaatoAforols (New York: Transactioo Publ1sht:n, i,6o), 318, 1~10. 
.. s. .. .,, K. Gtt.n, ~ 81/Jk, th• S<bool. "1fd th< ConstitNJKNt, ~ CIMb '""'' Sbap<4 Modnn 
Chffr<b-slate D«trinf (New York: Oxford Univen-ity Press,.1011). 
17 Mtehael J. Klarr1:m, .. Rerhinking the Civil Rights and Civil Libtrcies Revolutions, .. Virgmia 
Law Review(i9,6), 1-67.;o. 
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Around the same time, labor activists began ro exchange polarizing appeals 
to class struggle for the more anodyne language of civil liberties. ' 8 In the early 
' 92os, the novelist and labor organizer Up1011 Sinclair declared that there was 
"one platform upon which it should be possible to gel every true American" to 
stand with labor "for rhe purpose of bringing about industrial changes.• That 
platform was "free discussion,• an "ideal ... carefully embodied by our 
forefathers in the fundamental law of our nation and of every one of our 
separate states.••• In • 92.0, a group of attorneys and academics with pro-
labor sympathies formed the nation's lir;,r major civil libenies organization, 
the American Civil Libenies Union (ACLU), with the primary aim of securing 
constitutional prorecrion for pickets, OO)'COrts, and other organizing activities. 
In conjunction with rhe Industrial Workers of the World (!WW) and other 
groups from the labor movement's radical wing, the ACLU worked to 
reframc anti-organizing measures a~ affronts to the constitutional liberties of 
average Americans. 10 A panicularly successful strategy involved having labor 
activists who were barred from speaking under local ordinances or injunctions 
read the Bill of Rights in a public semng, such as a park, with the aim of being 
arrested. The jailing of citizen• whoo;c only apparenr crime was 10 read the 
Constitution aloud in public led many Americans to conclude !hat 
constitutional rights were, in foct, at stake on both sides of the picket line.'' 
The racial order was also undergoing unpreccdcmed changes as large 
nunibers of African American~ began to migrate northward in search of 
greaier economic opportunity in the nation's urban centers. Wiih expanded 
economic opportunity came the growth of an African American middle class, 
which in turn facilitated rhc founding of organizations, such as the NAACP, 
that were dedicated tO puhlicizing the evils of segregation and funding legal 
cha llenges to Jim Crow.J• In addition, the sudden enfra nchisement of large 
numhers of African Americans, many of 1hem concentrated in a handful of 
.r.ll Sec, for example, Ken I. Ktrseh, .. How <.:ondu..,·1 tk--:1mc Sptt<.·h and Spccch Rccamc Conduct: A 
Political Dcvclopmrm CaSt Srudy In l.ilbor Law and Lht frmlom of Spttch, .. U. Ptl. ]. Const. L. 
8 (2006), i;s-97. 273-77. 
19 Quoted in Paul L Murrhy, The Mtamng of 1-rttdom of Speech: 1-·1r11 Amendmttnt fTeedoms 
from Wit.son 10 FDR (Wcsrport, CT: Greenwood Prns, 1971~, J.S8-59. 
l
0 See, gt"nt"rally, Murphy, Tin Mt4ntng of Frttdom of Speech, u 7-30; /\1.ichad j. Klarman, 
"'Rtthi~ the Uvil Right$ and C"t\111 I 1bt:ntr.~ R<"voluttons. • Virginl4 Law Rcvit-w (1996): 
1-67, J9-40i Laura M. Wdnnb, •Ov11 l.J~rtK:.• 0Ut$1dc the Courrs, - Suprnne Court Revitw 
1014 (1014,: 197-J'l, J0,- 11. 
J • In 19u., for ~.xampk, the modcucc R~ublian editor Wilham Allen Whitt~ afttt bring briefly 
jailed for dtfr•n& a.o. indusuul coun urdd' proh1b1bng dl!iCU~~ton of that year·s naciooal rail.road 
smkc, penned a l'ulilUT pnu•WuuUnjC rolwnn on the suht= of frtt si-fl. Murphy, Tht 
M=mttofl'l'ttdo... o{!;ptt<h, •6•-<IJ. 
•• Doug McAd>m, l'ol1U<.t/ l'rouu a,.J tbt Dn'tlvpm .... 1 u( Black I~, ''Jo-1970, .ind 
ed. (Chiag<>o Un"""ny of O"'""° l'ms, io10); ~t.c:bad J. Kbrnun, f-rom }mt Cro«> to CA'll 
1Ugbt£ .,.,,_Su/"""' CoHn and th< Stntttk (OI" 1!.Kul /i.q..,/117 (New Y wk: Oxfocd Un;,..,.;'J' 
Pn:ss, 200j). 
Jjberries a11d the Dual Legacy of the Founding 
I swing srnres, conferred increased political in6uence and, ulrimarely, a 
favorable roceprion from the judiciary." Although the Supreme Coun 
not begin seriously rocngagc with the problem of racial segregation until 
94os and 1950s, the NAACP and its allies could by the 1920s poinr to a 
of Supreme Court decisions that, at the very least, east doubt on the 
tionaliry of racial disenfranchisement, residential segregation, and 
minated criminal trials. H 
IM midst of this atmosphere of social upheaval, justices Oliver Wendell 
, Jr., and Louis D. Brandeis penned a series of (mostly dissenting) 
Coun opinions that are widely seen as marking the birth of modem 
libnTics. Word War I and !he Red Scare of the early 192os provided the 
tc context for the great Holmes and Brandeis dissents. In 1917, 
had enacted the Espionage Act, the first federal law since the 
on Act of 1 798 to impose explicit limitations on pohtical speech. As the 
clttw to a cl~. and as Russia fell to the Bolsheviks, several states enacted 
anti-syndicalism laws that imposed criminal penalties on speakers who 
tcd the overthrow of the American political or economic systems. The 
e Court upheld both types of restrictions, reasoning that the First 
~menr did nor protect ;peakers who intended to sow social discord. 
lfDl-s and Brandeis, writing in dissent, argued that restrictions on political 
lpleCh should be upheld only in the event of a "dear and prt'SCnt danger" to.an 
111portant governmental interest - something that was lacking in cases hke 
Abrams v. U.S. (1919), where the speaker in question had, according to 
Holmes, merely thrown a few "silly" anarchist leaflets from a Manhattan 
sooftop." 
Arguably more important rhan this doctrinal innovation, however, was the 
11a1lar theory of political society 011 which it was based. In sharp contrast to 
llinefeenrh ·cenrury commentators, Holmes doubled that it was possible, on the 
.. sis of objective crireria, 10 distinguish morally worthy ideas from those that 
~ false or dangerous. American sociery, after all, was currently riven by 
moral disagreement. And the problem of identifying objective mora l principles 
became even more vexing when one considered the evolution of moral ideas 
Oftr time. American history was replete with examples of activities and forms of 
property- from slavery to liquor to lotteries - that were widely accepted or even 
oelebratcd in one era only to be condemned as immoral in the next (or vice 
wna).1' When one considered that "time haldl upset many fighting faiths,• it 
- unclear why notions of morality should play any role at all in the process of 
" K<vin J. McMahon, ltt<011JIMrotg ltO<Mvtll"" /tac.: I low tht l'midoicy Pa....d the /toad to 
a,.,,. .. (Chicogo' Un,..,..,.,. of 0.IOlgO p,..., J.010). 
,. ludwun v. Warley, 14J U.S.'° (1917); \ioorc v. l>mtpsty, 161 U.S. 8& ( 1923); N.i.xon v. 
Hemdon, •n U.S. n6 (19•7). 
" • 10 U.S. 616, 613 (1919), llolmcs,j.. d1umtmg. 
,. Amcnc:aM' evolY'lng amtudcs 1oward hql,M)f and k>tttty rcpboon had a pa.rticulady significant 
ODpacl on Holm<t's i!nnkiog abour 1hc nan= of consuruoonal riglns. Stt John W. Comp<on, 
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constitutiona l inrerpreialion.37 &ner, Holmes reasoned, to interpret the 
Consiitution without regard to 1he historical "accident of our finding certain 
opinions natural aod familiar or novel and even shocking. •31 
Bur how would judges delimit the boundaries of free speech, if not by 
reference to broadly shared mores? Drawing on an argument lirsr advanced 
by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill, Holmes answered that there was 
no need for lawmakers or judges to concern themselves with the social effects of 
particular ideas or creeds. Indeed, censorship was counterproductive, since 
governmenis were so ofien misraken in their judgmentS abou1 which ideas 
were so dangerou~ or wrongheaded as 10 justify suppression. And in an open 
exchange of views, ideas that were socially beneficial would generally triumph 
over those rhac were false or dangerous. "IT]he bes1 test of iruth," Holmes 
asserted, was "the power of the thoughr to get itself accepted in rhe competition 
of rhc marker."" 
Brandeis, in addition to endorsing Holmes's "marketplace" theory of speech, 
proposed r.har civil lihcrti<-s provisions were fundamentally concemt'<I with 
protecting individual autonomy. The framers of rhe Bill of RightS, he wrote in an 
oft-quoted dissent, hoped ro "secure conditions favorable ro che pursuit of 
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings, and of his intcllea ... "They sought ro protect Arncricnn, in their beliefs, 
their thoughts, !heir emotions and their sensations. They conferred ... the right to 
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights, and rhc righr most valued by 
civili~ men."'° Nineteenth-cenrury commentarors thus had the relarionsbip 
between conventional morality and republican government exactly backward: to 
teach 1hcir fuU potential, what citizens most needed was not the moral tutelage of 
the law bur rather a constirutionally prorected privare sphere. In addition, an 
expand'xl t"Onccption of civil liberties would hcnefit society by allowing citizens 
to boldly ns_scrt their views - whatever they might happen to be - in the public 
arena, rhereby developing their deliberative faculties and stimulating others to do 
the s.1me. Ir was not rbe heterodox thinker who was rhe "menace to freedom," but 
rather the "inert" citizen who blindly conformed to inhcriled mores.4 ' 
Although the Holmes and Brandeis dissents stimulated a great deal of 
discussion in academic circles, few of their fellow justices expressed much 
enthusiasm for the idea rhar couns should adopt a more asserlive srance in 
civil liberties cases. To be sure, a majority of the Court held for the 6m time in 
Cir/ow v. New York ( 1925) that the freedom of spc«h was among the righis 
protected from stare interference by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
TI.. r. ... ,.,.1,ca/ On11ns of tho Ln.;,.g Constitlltron (Cambndgr, MA' Huvard Uohtnity Pttu, 
z.oq), r)0-41. 
'' Abram$ v. U.S., 150 U.S. 616at 630, Holmes,J .• dis.~nring, 
t• Lochner v, New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905), Holmn;,J,. dimnring. 
19 Abrams v. U.S., 150 U.S. 6 16, 630 (1919), Holmes.1 J.1 dlslicnting. 
40 Olmstead v. U.S.1 177 U.S . . 438, 478 (19:i8), Brandeis,]., di.s10eming. 
4
' Whitney v. California, 147 U.S. 357, 375-?6 (r917), Brandci~,J., c:oncurring. 
mcnt.'' But even as the Court "i11corporated" 1he first Amendmem's 
IPC«h clause, ii declined to expand the substantive definition of "free 
... 
J and intellectual eli= were similarly ambivalenL Conservative 
tators, while supportive of judicially enforced economic rights, 
ly opposed enhanttd pr?rection for civil li~rties, at least :Where the 
00 question could be claimed by labor organizers.•• Progressives, while 
ly supportive of labor organi2ing, were skeptical of ane'."ptS to expand 
auihority at a time when the coum seemed reflexively hostile to 
ic regulation.• • The latter group was particularly alarmed by a string of 
5 in which the Cowct had blocked attempts to tl'gulate rhe wages and 
of workers. In the most nowrious of these rulings, Lochner v. New York 
S), the Court found that a Jaw limiting rhc working hours of bakery 
yees was nm a legitimate hea~th or safety regul!ti<m bu! rather. an 
itutional interference wllh the liberiy of contract, a liberty ostensibly 
in the Fourteenth Amendmenl's due process clause.46 If the justices 
simply reading their laissez-faire policy preferences into the Fowcreenrh 
nr - and progressives were convinced this was case - then ii made 
ICflSC 10 provide the Coun with yet another doctrinal tool that could be used 
diwart me will of democratic majorities. 
Slrq>ucism of judicial auihority remained de rigucwc among left-leaning 
~ns in 193z., when Franklin D. Rooscvcl1 won !he presidency in what 
.,.aid come t0 be seen as a realigning election. Between 1937 and r943, Roo-
..,dt would appoint eight justices to rhc Coun. Precisely how this unpr=denred 
penonnel turnover would impact constitutional doctrine_ wa~ unclear, howev~r. 
On !he one hand, as Michael J. Klarman has pointed our, FOR s dt"<.1:0ral victones 
were underwrinen by "an extraordinary assemblage of traditional ourgroupS," 
lndudmg or!l'lnized labor, religious and ethnic minorities, and, eventually, African 
,\mericans.•7 Ro=vclt's presidency therefore conferred a degree of polincal 
iDftucncc on precisely chose groups who srood to gain from a mote assertive 
j:IGllltrUCtion of the Constitution's civil liberties provisions. On che orher hand, 
- New Dealers - and even many labor leaders - were initially reluctant to 
.. "' u.~. ,,._ 
., "' U.~. 6 s u1 6J8. Thus, !ht Gitlow C'.oun found thac the Coruutuuoo offcral no pro«coon ro 
1 lj><ak<r wbo advoab:d •revofurionary nuil ICt""' • for the purpo5< of m....iu-ong the 
C1pttal1.sc: o;onomic systtm. 
.. For an 1nsighrful cfucu.ssioJl of rhc consttYati\ot t.btmrun dcJnue of frtt speech, see .Mark A. 
Gnbu, Trrzmfmming fo-.. Spuch, Thr Ambit_, ug;Jq of Ovrl l.tbntaria>rism (llerkd<f' 
lh:u~criutyof California Press. 1990), 17- 49. 
ti Olk major cxa:ptioo ro rhe rule was Z«hariah Cha(fcc, whose writings on the freedom ol 
tptt\.h arc thought to h<WC inAucnctd jusrice 1 lol!Tk!i. ~e. for example. Cha.fee's Frudom of 
Spetch (New York: Harcourt, Bract and Howe, 19z.o). 
., 198 U.S. 4l ( •90J). 
41 Klarman, .. Rethinking rhc Ci\•iJ Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions," 44-45. 
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augment rhe Coun's aurhority at a moment when the Democraric Party had 
stranglehold on rhe levers of lcgislarive aurhoriry.•8 Morco•-er, even if ~ 
reconstituted _Court could be rrusted to interpret !he Constitution in ways that 
comported wuh the prograrnnuric goals of the Democratic regime, ir was unclear 
how, at the level of doctrine, !he jusoces could simultaneously devalue economic 
rights and expand civil liberties protections. To many observers, including futurt 
Supreme Court Jusrice Felix Frankfurter, it seemed that the wiser SL1noe was an 
across·the·board polky of judicial deference. 
justice Harlan Fiske Stone's majority opinion in U.S. v. Cnrolene Products 
( 1938) pointed rhe way out of this theoretical thickct.49 In the opinion's famous 
Foornote Four, Stone offered a pair of theories to explain why an expansive 
conccpnon of civil liberties was not incompatible wirh a deferential approach to 
economic regulation. First, he poinred out rhat the individual righrsenshrined in 
the "first ten amendments" had a firmer basis in the text than economic due 
process rights. Where che early-rwentieth-cenrury Court had relied on a series of 
judicially created doctrines - including the "liberry of contract" - to obstruct 
the rise of rhe regulato ry state, the post- New Deal Court would confine its 
scrminy of democratically enacted laws to those thllt violated textually 
grounded righrs, including the freedoms of speech and religion. Second, Stone 
noted that in casc-s where the democrntic process had been corrupted or where 
"discrete and insular minoritiet." had been singled out for negative treatment, 
judicial enforcement of individual rights could not fairly be described as 
undermining dem~ratic principles. True, rhe exercise of judicial revitw in 
such cases would have the effect of overturning laws that reflected (ar least 
superficially) the will of the majoriry, but in so doing the Court would be 
preserving the imegrity of the underlying democratic system - something that 
could nor be said of the prc~New Deal Court's decisions inva lidating broadly 
popular economic regulations. 
When combined with the earlier opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, Stone's 
C'.nrolene Products footnote provided rhe blueprint for a radically new 
approach ro civil liberties. Instead of relying on inherited mores or religious 
views to mark the boundary between liberty and license, the Court would now 
read the Constitution's civil liberties provisions as demanding maximum scope 
for the free play of ideas and the self-development of individual cirizens. And 
instead of assuming that longstanding inegalitarian features of American 
sociery were essential to the survival of republican government and thus 
deserving of judicial deference, the Court would take a skeptical view of laws 
that worked to the disadvantage of "discrete and insular minorities." For the 
next three decades, the .First Amendment and other civil liberties provisions 
would bent their most potent in precisely those cases that justice Taney and the 
'' On orpn1ztd labor's skepctca.I attatude 1owards r:hc judiciary, xc WcllU'tb, •CiV11 Ubtrties 
outsKkmeCoum,• ,,,_,,. 
" J04 U.S. •H (1U8). 
Scort majority had rejected as ~impossible" to take seriously - that is, 
pitting marginalized citi•ens against encreoched patte ms of state and local 
·ry. 
a1GllTS REVOLUTION, i 938- t973 
the late i 93os and the c.uly 197os, the Supreme Court presided o~cr a 
revolution" that stood the nineteenth-century theory of rhe const1tut1onal 
on irs head. By the end of rhis period, it was genera lly accepted tha_t the 
of speech, the free exercise of religion, and most of the other 1Dd1~1dua l 
enshrined in rhe Bill of Rights were ( 1) enjoyed equally by all Amencans; 
· on all levels of govcrnmenr; and (3) more or less inviolable, save in the 
of a compelling ihre:u to public saftty or basic govem~n~l fun~ons. The 
effect of the new way of minking was to elevate ovil h~es dauns above 
cradirionally superior claims of domestic and local authority. Long relegated 
1 peripheral position in American consritutional law, civil liberties now became 
• fixed star" around which rhe constitutional system was said to revolve. 10 • • 
If a single decision can be said to epitomize the Court's .new approach to CIVIi 
·es ir is West Virgilrin v. Barnette, a r943 case involv111g a group of 
ah's Wimess children who were expelled from public school for refusing 
u lure the flag.'' Only three years before, the Court, in an opinion by j ustice 
fnnJcfurter, had upheld a similar compulsory Oag salute _la~ on !he gr_o.unds 
•r efforts to promote a patriorie cirizellfY were ~veil_ within rhe i_r.idmonal 
llounds of state and local authoriry. P But now three 1us11ces, perhaps mRuenced 
llJ widespread reports of officially sanctioned mob violence against Jehov~'s 
W°itmSSCS, had come to see the matter differently, and the Court reversed •ts 
....Uer ruling.53 • 
Writing for the Rnmette m:tjoriry,justice Rohcrtjackson made rwo key pom~s. 
Finr he denied that the scope of the Constitution's civil liberties guarantees was m 
lllY ;..,.y afft.'Cted by the admittedly "delicate and highly discr<.'tion;irr functio~s.· of 
local government. Perhaps he was thinking of the Witnesses well-pubhcizcd 
1nvails. Or perhaps he was thinking of seve:ral recent cases mat had draw_o 
-.hon to orber abuses of local authority, including the routine denial of basic 
aiminal procedure protections ro Souchem blacks and the use of facially neutral 
licensing schemes to obstruC'l labor organizing."' Jn any event, jac~n concluded 
dw "small and local authority," far from serving as the essennal guardian of 
cirittns' liberties, was comparatively more likely than national authority to 
,. Wes1 Virginia Staie Bd. of f.duc. v. B:nnt ue, )19 U.S. 6i.4 , 641 ( 1943). 
t• J•9 U.S. 6~ .. , 641 (•~HJ). '' MinecsviUeSchool Oi!itrict '" Gobi1is, JIO U.S. 586 ( t9 40). 
n On rhe possibilicy th:at the justices in the Ba:rnetu m3jority wcr-c infl uf'11Ctd by rc-~m of mob 
vtoknce, see Kevin J. Mc~bhon, R«011$Ulering R.oouwll on Rau: How t~ Prnidmcy Pdwd 
IN Road 10 Brown (ChJCagO: Unnf'rs:.icy of Oi.K::ago Press, io10). , .. ~ .. r. 
" Stt, 1oc cnmplc. Powdl •.Abba.,,., >87 U.S. 4j (1,)1); Noms v. Abba.,,., 294 U.S. j87 
h'Jj~ Hagu< v. Conurutttt foe Industrial o.gan;utioo, )07 U.S. 496 c-,,,). 
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threaren rhcm. Instead of deferring to the cdim of "village tyrants," the Coun 
would henceforth be especially diligent in scrutinizing their activities.H 
Second, Jackson laid to rest che ninereenrh-ccnrury undemanding of the 
relationship between religious and moral orrhodoxy on the one hand 
and republican government on the other. In sharp conrrast to James Kent 
and the countless nineteenth-century commentators who had defended che 
constitutionality of blasphemy laws, Jackson's reading of history indicated 
that arrempts to achieve "[c)ompulsory unification of opinion" in matters of 
religion were destined to fail or else to achieve "only the unanimity of the 
gra vcyard. • Nor was there any credible evidence to suggest that allowing 
citizens the "freedom to be intellecrnally and spiritually diverse" would 
"disintegrate the social organization. "S6 Henceforth, the J'irst Amendment 
would be understood to require that common convictions be arrived at 
volu ntarily or nor at all. 
But if Barnette indicated that the Court would not hesitate to dismantle 
entrenched authority in the name of universal righrs, it provided lirde in the way 
of a brooder theory that might delineate a new boundary between individual 
liberty and official authoriry. Unable to invoke the idea of a sock-ry-wide moral 
consensus for this purpose, the mid<rntury Court relied instead on Holmcs's 
marketplace metaphor and Brandeis's autonomy ideal The marketplace 
metaphor provided the rationale for a series of decisions that effectivdy stripped 
stare and local governments of their longstanding authoriry to regulate public 
discourse. Laws punishing subversive speech were now unconstitutiunal in the 
absence of a "clear and present danger" to an important governmental interest (or, 
in rhe later, more stringent formulation, where the speaker seemed likely to unleash 
"imminent lawless violence")." Laws that indirectly restricted speech in the 
interest of public safery or convenience had to be narrowly tailored and neutral 
with rcsp<."<."t to the viewpoint of the speaker. Requiring licenses of speakers was 
permissible in certain limited cases (as when a group sought to hold a parade on a 
busy public street), bur license laws were to be purely administrative in nature, 
leaving officials powerless to discriminate against particular ideas or speakers.'1 
The Court's critics-including internal ones like Frankfurter-warned that che new 
docrrincs would leave states and municipaliries powerless to combat the social 
unrest char inevitably accompanied extremist speech making. But a majoriry of the 
justices were willmg to run the risk of occasional disorder if in so doing they 
prev~ted an even greater evil - namely, the "srancbrdizatioo of ideas" by 
"dominant political or community groups. •s• 
'' In adchrton. jackJ()fl reasoned th.ar consrirunoo41J V1olanoru: ar rht lool lcvcl "~more ljkdy 
acapc ckrccuoo, \in« rhc '"agents of publiciry"' were rypteally ~, d1l1gent in reporting on them. 
)19 U.S. 6•~ at 6J?-J3. 
'' Wesr Virginia Sure Board of Education v. Bamcm:, J r9 U.S. 614, 641 {19.0). 
J., Brandenburg v. O hio, J9S U.S. 444 (1969). 
'' Cantwell v. Connc:ctic:ut, Jto U.S. 296 (194o);S3i:a v. New York, JJ4 U.S. ssB (19 .. 8). 
ft Tcrminitllo v, Chic.1.go, JJ7 U.S. t , 4 ( 1949). 
· J.iberties and the Dual Legacy of the Fmmdi11g 
In decisions involving constitutional challenges to nineteenth-century morals 
the Court regularly invoked some version of Brandeis's "right to be let 
, • a right that extended beyond spacia l privacy to include a guarantee of 
· nal autonomy with respect to (among other things) matters touching 
sex and reproduction. In Stanley v. Crorgia (1969), for example, the 
'°"" mvalidatcd a state law making it a crime to possess obscene material. 
1'riring for the majority, Justice Thurgood Ma!'lhall reasoned that "a State has 
_,business telling a man, sirring alone in his own home, what books he may 
.-cl or what films he may watch."'° 
(cnrury-uld laws restricting the sale, distribution, and use of contraceptives met 
uimilar fate in Griswold v. Connecticm (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971).'' 
MrJiough rarely enforced, contraception bans were dt"termincd by the Warren-era 
julticcs to violate a constirutionally enshrint-d right to reproductive privacy, a right 
.,enrually found to be lodged in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 
1bc underlying problem was that Coms1ock-era contraception laws inserted "the 
_.chincry of the criminal law" into rhe heart of citiz.cns' most intimate 
adlbotl~hips and personally consequential decisions.•• "If the right of privacy 
_.., anything,• the Court declared in Eisenstadt, i1 was that citizens were "to 
lie free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
.&ccung a person as the decision whether ro bear or beget a child.••> 
Autonomy rationales also figured prominently m a series of contemporaneous 
decisions that dismantled many longstanding symbols of Protestant cultural 
IMgcmony. Writing for the Court in Ewrson v. Board of Ed1tcation 
(1947), Justice Hugo Black found that the autho!'l of the First Amendmenr 
llld intended to erct"t a "high and impregnable" "wall of separation" berween 
church and state.64 The case turned on the question of whether a local 
pttnmcnr could use public funds to offset the cost of transponing students to 
Catholic schools, and a bare majority of the Court answered in the affirmative. 
But it was Black's reading of the Establishme1ir Clause - as opposed to the rather 
incongruous holding - rhat marked the real turning point. Henceforth, the First 
Amendment would preclude not only the recognition of a national church but 
YinuaUy any officia I act that might be construed as encouraging citizens ro adopt 
a particular point of view concerning religion. By the early 196os, the Court had 
prohibited teacher-led prai•er and Bible reading in the public schools on the 
• E- 1( "8>nmatr muons f<n policing penonal morahry <XU(cd (which l\Unhall doubml~ rh< 
" pii&looorf>yol th< FustAm<ndmtnr' would noc pcnnu th.sure 10 pun..e1agoalsbf policing 
·pn~1tc thougha• or the •private consumpnon of 1cku a.od mfoonatioo."' 394 U.S. lS7 ar 
H"'°l7· 
•• Jlt U~. 479 (1965); 405 U.S. iJ8, H3 (1971). 
.., POt v. Ullman, 167 U.S. 497, H3 {r96t) Harl.tn,J., dt"'nung; Griswold v. Connecticut, J t 8 
U.S. H9 l1965). 
•• Eikn,tadt v, &ird, 40s U.S . . 08, 453 (197:z.). Emphasis addtd. 
"' Etweraon v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , 18 ( 1947). The phrase .. wall of separation" was 
borrowed from Thomas Jefferson's 18o:z. letter to the l)11nbury l\aprisr Association. 
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grounds that these practices exerted "coercive pressure" on children 10 adopt the 
religious views of the nujority.'s A similar logic underpinned a subscquem series 
of religious free exerci!e decisions that granted religious believers the right to 
demand exemptions from generally applicable laws. Under the doctrine 
announced in Sherbert v. Verner (1965), citittns whose ability to practice their 
chosen faith was "substantially burdened" by a stare or federal law were cntidcd 
ro relief unless rhe govunmenr could demonstrate that granting an exemption 
would endanKcr a compelling govcmmemal interest." 
In kttping with the theory of the Caro/me Prod11Gls foo1no1e, the mid-century 
Court was ar its most assertive - and creative - in cases where an individual or 
group could plausibly claim to have been silenced or disenfranchised by 
structural incqua litil>s or fla,vs in the nation's rcprc.'Scnrotive system of 
governmcn1. Indeed, wha1 gives the period's major civil liberties decisions a 
sense of coherence, even in the face of bitter disagreemem over par1iculars, is 
1ha1 rhe Court !ended to read both rhe marketplace and autonomy ideals through 
the lens of Carole11c Products. Without necessari ly raking a position on the 
relative importance of liberty and equality as constirurional values, the Coun 
insis1cd 1ha1 itS institutional role demanded a more robust response 10 alleged 
civil liberties violations .nvolving traditionally subordinated Americans. Because 
judicial authority was most legitimate, and thus most poo:nt, in cases whcre the 
dcmOCTatic proa:ssc:s had gone awry, it was incumbent upon the Coun to pay 
careful attention to bow authority - whether public, private, or a fusion of the 
two - was actually experienced by citizens. This would ensure that the 
marketplace and auronomy ideals were reali1.cd in fact, not just in theory. 
The guarantee of an unfettered ideological marketplace, for example, 
demanded more 1han formal stare neutrality with respect ro a speaker's 
identity or message. even facially neutral speech regula rions now posed First 
Amendment problems when their practicol effect was ro diminish expressive 
opportunities for traditionally subordinated groups. Ordinances banning the 
distribution of handbills were struck down in part because they outlawed a 
mode of communication favored by labor organi1ers,Jehovah's Witnesses, and 
other advocaccs of "poorly financed causes. "'7 State laws banning picketing or 
'S: F\•.-n 1l rh11A'"" vi.'""' P"""i~ to npr nu:t ol •mrh r~•m~, rhnr ,,.m•i,_f •.111n ~tt. 
pttHUt< upon the duld to atttnd, • and those who ttfus<d woulJ lildy "haw in<ubt<d in 
dwm a fec'hng ol kpllllta.m.. •Engel v. Viuk, 370 U.~. 411 at .01; ~tcCollwn w, Board of 
Educauoo, JJJ U.S. 101 a i.27 . 
.. n,,. rule 1ppl.od .. .,. 10 .........,.., such as rompulsoty tduauoo bws and Wltlllployment 
compmsatton programs, ~ thttt was oo reason 10 btliie\.e th.al 1ht Uiltt had intended ro 
butdtn "''"'°"' Pfil<IK<. As jusuc:e Bttnnan explained 1n hi$ opinion f0< the Sha'-< majority, 
rhc F1rn Am~dmcnt dtd ll()( pemm che srarc fO •prwurc• :a puson "to choose between 
following rhe precepts of her rehgion ~ on rhe one hand and obeying the l.1w {or receiving 
bcncf;n) on the other. Sh:rbcrr v. Verner, 374 U.S. j9H. -404 (196j). Also 5CC Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,~~ U.S. 105 (097!). 
'~ MaNin v, Srrurhc"*t }19 U.S. t . p. r46 (1943). Also"~ Schneider v. The St:atc, 308 U.S. 147 
( o939). 
· g labor organizers ro register with rhe srare were similarly problematic, 
• ir practical effect was to silence the traditionally disadvantaged side in 
ing debate over "the desriny of modern mdustrial society. "68 
C..ourt's egalitarian reading of 1he First Amcodmenralso played a critical 
iD di>maoding the South's racial caste sysrem. As late as the early 196os, 
officials bad ar their disposal a range of leµI rools that appeared well 
10 turmng back challenges to whire supremacy. These included statutes 
nng the activities of out-of-state corporations, statures barring outside 
from organizing or funding litigation, and the long-established right of 
· officials to bring libel suits against group~ or indiv·duals who damaged 
reputations. Although most of rhesc wols were well wirhin rhe traditional 
of ...rate and local authority, the Court used the First Amendment to block 
of 1hcm in turn. In NAACI' v. l'atterson \ 195~), 1t held that a state could 
force a civil rights group to disclose its membership rolls where there was 
to believe rhar group members would face "economic reprisal, loss of 
yment, [and rhe) threat of physical coercion.••• Similarly, in NAACP v. 
(1963), the O>Urt refused ro "dose firs] eyes to the fact" that facially 
I laws targeting cbamperry and barrarry - in c-scncc, the stirring up of 
ous law•uits - were being used to deprive African America11s of the "sole 
able avenue" by which they migh1 sttk redress for injuries suffered at the 
of the "politically dominant (whirel community."~ A final landmark 
~on, New York Times v. S11//ivan (r964), e\'1sccrated the common law of 
.. as 1t applied to public officials." In addition 10 setting aside an Alabama 
I-Y's $500,000 libel award to a police commissioner who b.ad been criticized in 
print by a civil rightS group, Sullivan held rhat public officials hoping to win a 
~ judgment would henceforth have ro meet the high standard of proving 
"11C1Ual malice."" Any less stringent standard, 1he majority reasoned, would 
... Ye the effect of "chilling First Amendment freedoms in rhe area of race 
lllations."" 
Ar rhc same time, die mid-cenniry Court adoptc-d a more deferential approach 
illcasb where the stare- or, more likely, the federal government- could plausibly 
claim ro be acting with the aim of mitigating the effects of structural inequality on 
Amcncan dcm<lctacy. The justices were particularly ~kcptical of claims that the 
Pint Amendment protected corporate or commercial speakers from the emergent 
• lu. thcC<>wt J.du.d in lbomhill v. Alaba.., ( t940), rh. Ml cka>1m 1ou1<ndcoosoruoonal 
""""""°I<> ubo< pi<Jct<ing. me Jodoc;ary'< l""P<' ruk "°'DUI tu Jd<n<J I.be indusmal "arus 
quo bur rou.bcr to C'.USUtt thal "'rhc group 1n powCI' at any rnummt (dots:J ooc: un.pose penal 
.. ""rt0ns .. on those who;1dvoacc for pc:aiccfuJ polir-.~I ur n.voomJC :hangt:. 310 U.S. 38, 103, 
104 ( 1940). tor tM Coun".s dccisiQn on '3ws rC'(fuirin~ tabor orpnatn to rcg:isrc:r widi the: st:.t1t, 
•Th(')mas v. Colhns. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
" ll7 U.S. 449· ~6• ( r958). ,. pt U.S. 4'l• 4)0-J o (196J). " J76 U.S. >54 ( 0965}. 
,. Th.at as, that rhe statement in question wa.s made with knowledge o( 1u fa lsity or with r«Jdess 
dintKard for the nurh. 
,. lhtd.1.n 101. 
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rcgularory srare. In order ro discourage such claims, they drew a bright line 
between expressive activities thar were primarily concerned with moneymaking 
and those that were not. Advenising and soliciting were distinguishable from 
the core FJ.l'Sr Amendment activiries of "communicaring mformarion and dis. 
scminaring opinioofs]," the Court rca<0ned, and thus less worthy of judicial 
prorcction.74 A similar line of reasoning produced a decision distinguishing pl'(l-
fessional lobhying efforts from the expressive activities of ordinary Americans. As 
Chief jusrice Earl Warren wrote for rhe Court in U.S. v. Harriss ( r954), lll'W 
federal regularions requiring lobbyisrs to r<-gi~'tcr with the C'A>ngrc.s and disclose 
their sources of income were not an affront to First Amendment rights bur rather a 
reasorutble means of ensuring that "the voice of rhe people" was not "drowned out 
by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatmem while mas-
querading as proponenrs of the public weal. ··s 
l.aws rhar made union membership a condition of cmploj•ment in certain 
industries also surviv<-d First Amendment scrutiny. That some workers should 
be required to join and contribute to unions followed narurally from rhe reigning 
Democraric Parry's view rhar collecrive bargaining offered the suresr route to 
industrial peace. By the r95os, however, critics of organi1.cd labor had seized on 
the idea rhat mandatory union contributions violated the First Ame11dment by 
compelling anti-union workers to subsidize expressive activiries rhat they 
opposed. In International Association of Machinists v. Street (1961), rhe Cottrt, 
speaking through justice Brennan, agreed rhar workers could not be compelled ro 
support political activiry again5t their wills. At the same rime, Brennan found that 
workers could be required to contribute ro a union, so long as the compelled 
contributions were used only for core union acrivities such as organizing elections 
and representing workers in negoriarions with employers. Alrhough the First 
Amendment offered individual ciriu:ns protection against compelled speech, it 
also gunranm::d the right of "the majority" of workers to form :rnd opemre a 
union without "being silenced by the dissenters." Indeed, rhe Court was 
consrirurionally obligated to balance rhe rights of individua l workers against 
the right~ of workers as a class, protecting "both interests to the maximum 
extent possible without b>ctmiuingJ undue impingement of one on the other."76 
THE REVOLUTION'S TROUBLED LEGACY 
Clearly, the middle decades of the rwentieth cenrury witnessed a significant 
resrrucruring of American sociery. Srill, rhe question remains: Do these 
'" Valcnrinc v. Chresrcnsc.n. 316 U.S. 51 :u S4· 
.,, U.~. v. Harri""- 347 U.S. 6n., 6i.5 (1954). The l:tw ddincd a "lobhy1i1t .. :u a pcr$0n "receiving 
any conrrihurions or expending any money"' for the purpose of influcncing the pas$agc or defeat 
of kgi11l:nic)n. Chief Justice Warren, 1pokfr1g for the m3;ority, agrttd. th;u the :Kt would havt co 
I>< 1t>d ft3rrowly- as applying only to pood lobbyists who nguluty coos.Uoed wioh mM1btts of 
Congrns- w survive constitutional JCr'Unny. 
.. '''U.S. 7•0. 773 (19'1). 
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y significant devclop~enrs amounr to a r~l~tion? If rh.e t~rm implies 
break with the governmg suucrures and lcgonmanng pnnc1ples of the 
81 well as the successful consrruction of new amangements underpinned by 
rive principles, then it is at least arguable that the Court's adminedly 
rroarive rulings fell short of this srandard. Indeed, rwo problems - one 
· al and one theoretical - plagued the mid-cenrury Court's civil liberties 
dence, foreshadowing rhe eventual unraveling of the post- New Deal 
sus 011 civil liberties. The prat'tical problem was that the jusrices, aware 
Court's limited capaciry w enforce its own decisions, ofren seemed to pull 
from principled stands when confronted wirh credible threats of 
d noncompliance. As a result, the "rights revolution" ended with 
· nt vestiges of the old order still very much in place. 
Consider the ill-fated anempt to decouple church and state. The early 196os 
• •0 ns on prayer and Bible reading in the schools made clear that the "wall of 
rion • metaphor was more rhan empry rhetoric, as did a separate decision 
lidating religious tesrs for state officeholdc:rs.11 And yet the Court's 
rationist reading of the F.sta blishmcnt Clause was never fully marched by 
loprnenrs 0 11 the ground. The school prayer rulings, in particular, proved 
llfticult to enforce; a number of contemporary academic studies found that 
lmlDY public school teachers and administrators simply ignored them.18 
Ir is surely no accident rhat rhe Court, in the face of widespread opposition to 
Ill rulings on religion in the schools, declined to follow Jusrice Black's metaphor 
toils logical conclusion." When confronted with a challenge ro the tax-exempt 
llllUS of religious entities in Walz v. Tax Commimon ( 1970), for example, the 
~stopped short of ordering what would surdy have ~n the largest tax 
IDaeasc in American hisrory. lndt-ed, even jusuce Black 1omed a tortuous 
•ioriry opinion holding that governments that exempred religious bodies 
6om taxation were nor "sponsoring" religion, but merely "ahstain[ingJ from 
•anding that the churches support the state. ""0 (Never mind that rhese tax 
exempt entities received, free of charge, a variety of public services.) Sunday 
closing laws and legislative prayers likewise survived Establishment Clause 
dialknges.81 Viewed collecrivcly, rhese rulings made clear thar the rights 
"Tocasov. Watlum, 3'7 U.S. 4U (1,61). 
,. On local d<futnce ohh< Court'111chool pnyer rulinp in th< 1 '6oo and 1 nos. - Lucas A. Powe, 
Jr .• Tbe Warren Cottrt and AmmC'Dn Politics (Cambridgt, MA: Setkmp Press, "1000), j62-~J; 
Daniel K. Willi•ms. God'• Own Party, Tbe Making of Utt Christuzn Right (New York, Oxford 
University Press. 1010), f.7, 
" On the public reaction tn £11g~I v. Vitale, see Powe, 11Jc "'""'"' Cottrl (IHd Amerkan Polities, 
187-90; Williams, Cod'10wn Party, 6~67. AsWllli.ims pointsouc,bc:JWccn r96i.and 1964 no 
lewtr than 111 mcmbcri of Conp-tss introduced consutucfonal :.mcndmcnt!i overturning tht 
C.ou.n's decision barring prayer in the public schools. 
'"Wal ... Tax Ccxnmiuoonof C"yol NtwYock, 3'7 U.S. u,, 67J (1970). 
• Aht.oogh Sunday Milli bws wttt undoubl<dly rdiglom in origin, a majority oi oh< Coun 
loand 1ha1 they also t<n'ed oht S<CUlar purpose of prottctsngahU'ru' "hcolth, saftty, """""""-
Md gmenJ ....U-besng. • McCowan v. M.2rybnd. 366 U.S. 410, ••• ( • 9'•). L<gislativc pnycn, 
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revolution would not end with the complete secularization of the American 
scare. 
A similar gap between principle and doctrine can be seen in the Court's 
decisions on sexual and reproductive privacy. In <triking down a Massachusetts 
law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the 
Court had seemed to suggest that any official intrusion imo the ~decision wbcdier 
to ~r or beget a child" was a fundamental violation of petSOnal autonomy. The 
Court's willingness to issue such a sweeping statement of principle may be 
explained in part by the fac"t that the nation's contraception laws had all but 
lapsed into desuetude; in fact, the states that still had such laws on the books 
defended them by claiming that there was no constitutional injury to redress, 
since the laws were never enforced. 
Regulnrion of abortion, in contrast, was alive and well in 1973 when the 
Court dtoeidcd Roe v. Wade."' This may explain why rhe Court felt it advisable 
to adopt a more cautious and pragmatic tone in its landmark abortion decision, 
even as ir broadened the scope of the underlying righr. Whatever the reason, 
Blackmun and the Roe majority determined rhar the primary problem with 
abortion resrrictions was not that they interfered wirh privacy in the sense of 
individual autonomy but rather that they impinged upon the patient-physician 
relationship. Seen in this light, che consrirurional right to access abortion 
services had to be balanced against rhe srare's interest in protecting the bealch 
of the mother and, in the latter stages of pregnancy, the health of the fetus.'' 
Although R0t's immediate effect was to expand access to abortion services 
throughout the nation, the medical privacy frame suggested obvious routes by 
which abortion opponents might narrow, if not negate, rhe right ro terminate a 
pregnancy. 
while ccnainly intended tt;t promote resprt-'t for rdig:iun, were too .. deeply c:n:LbcJJed in the 
!nation's) hilitory and tt'.&.dition"' to be deemed incompatible with lhc flill&blish.intll t Clause. 
Manh v. Ohambc.., ~6) U.S. 783, 786 (1983). 
h Danid K. Will11nu. •No Happy .Medium: The Role o( Amerians' Ambivalem View of Fetal 
J(jA1>11 rn Political Confilc1 o'tr Abonion L<g;tlitatioi~ • f o•mal of Policy History 1s.1 (101))' 
41-61. By this Pomt lhe Libtraliurioo movt-mtnt of rht l.tite 196os. dunng whJC:h numerous 
.,., .. had l<phud tb<npeuoc abonioos and 1v»o had ltgahud abonoon •oo demand,• had 
tfftt"'<fy 11alltd. Wrllwm pomB ou1 chat although numttO<As ,.., .. adopud dicrape•m< lows 
in the Iott 196os, only°"" (Ronda) did so afler 1970, and 1lm as• mull ol a_,, order. In 
•n•. !Wtnry-live tu« lcgr,J,ru,.. debated sudl laws, and all me ..,., ... ,.. ~ dcfcotcd. 
Mo~r. ' " r971~ TO<Crs m rwo SQtes (Michig:an :1nd Nonh lnkou) ddCurd thcr.tpcutic 
:1bomon rcfonn 1n snlttwiclc rcfcrcncb. Also in t97.i.. the New Yorti: legislature: repealed dut 
narc'• liberal abort100 law, but the rcpc:tl kgisbrion wic mocd by Governor Ndson 
Rockefeller. 
• ' "'The Coun·11 dcci'l1c>n1 rccognjzing a right of privacy also acknowledge that wm.c- state rcgub· 
tion in areas protected by that right is appropriate . . . A St3.te mjy properly lb:iert imp0rtanr 
imeresu in s-ifc-guarding hc-.alth, iu maintaining medical standard~ and in protecting potentia1 
lift. At some Point in prtg111u1cy, thtse respective interests become su(ficitndy col\\pelling ro 
sustain regulation ohht faclOrs th:u go,•enl the abortion deci.sion.'" .po U.S. 113, J..H (1973). 
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11ic theoretical problem that dogged civil liberties jurisprudence in this period 
rhc rather murky narure of rhe rclarionship between the Court's civil 
principles and its egalirarian theory of American democracy. We have 
that the Court rejected Firsr Amendment challenges to commercial speech 
nons, lobbying regulations, and union shop agreements. Bur it bears 
s that ea<:h of these decisions provoked spirited dissents arguing that 
... maiority was permitting lawmakers to run roughshod over rights that the 
O,Urt had earlier declared inviolable. Thu•, a 195 1 decision finding rhat rhe First 
,Aondmenr did nor protect door-to-door conunercial solicitation led Justice 
Jllclc to ask why a salesman hawking subscriptions to the Saturday Evening 
Pott should be afforded less constirurional protection than a Jehovah's Witness 
0t labor organizer engaged in the door·to-door distribution of handbills. In each 
cue, Black alleged, rhe end result o f rcgularion was to "hobble" the free 
l:ktulation of "religious or political ideas."8' When the Court in 1955 upheld 
die Federal Lobbying Act, Justice William 0. Douglas wondered why the Court 
lilCI only ten years before struck down a seemingly similar Texas law thar 
aequired labor organizers to regisrer with rhe State. At lcasr to Douglas, it 
~ that boch laws exerted a chilling eUect 011 speech, forcing speakers t() 
11e9d cautiously-or else refrain from speaking entirely- for fear of crossing "che 
psoiubited line" that divided constirutionally prorcctcd expression from paid 
OIPni.ung or lobbying acrivities.31 And when the Court in 1961 upheld the 
consmurionality of mandatory union contributions, Black attacked bis fellow 
jllllim for seeming to abandon th~ con: prin<:iplc of West Virginia v. Bamette-
mmcly, that citiu:ns could never be forced ro endorse or subsidize political 
speech wirh which they disagreed. 86 
In theory, the mid-cenrury Court might have produced a body of doctrine 
Illar mt«grated principled commitments to free expression, personal autonomy, 
111d egalitarian democracy into a coherent whole. llut this was not to be. All roo 
illten, rhe justices asserted the constirutionality of measures char seemed likely 
llO mitigate the effects of entrenched inequality withour offering clear 
explanations of how particular policies mighr be reconciled with an expansive 
conceptron of personal autonomy or the idea I of an unfrttercd marketplace of 
idea~. On other occasions, the justices fractured into competing camps based 
llOWld irreconcilable theories concerning the relationship between civil liberties 
"' lltt&nJ •.Alexandria, H• U.S. 611, 6so (•" r). Bbck,J., W...Oung. 
•• U.S.'· 1-1.un>s, l47 U.S. 611, 631 (•9HI· Dooglu,J., <L.seotwg. 
" ~L. dou.btied that unions were ap1.1blc of m2inu1ning SttKlly ttpa.ra1c acx:oums for politic."UI 
IAd col&cco"e batgaining .ai;rivitics.. Jn :tll liltdihood, he rtaSOMd, c.bc obj«ring cmploytt would 
l'Kcwe only few penn_1cs on rhc dQllu- an amount that mi&J'it or might not rcfkct the true t'xtent 
of the umon·s poliocal ;activities. MnnwhiJc, the employee would remain officially af6Jiattd 
•1th :in organi-iation whose aims he despistd. The union sccunty a.grttmmt thus violated .. ., 
nwn'11 C()nstnutional right to be wholly frtt from 11ny sort or governmental cotnpulsion in rhe 
ticprC")SIOn o( opinion.._ ... International Association of Machinists v. Street~ 367 U.S. 7-401 197 
(1961). Bladc,J., dissenting. 
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and the regulatory state. As a result, the rights revolution bequea:hed a troubled 
legacy, leaving ~hind a body of law that was plagued by inremal tensions and, 
when wielded by justices ot a ditterent ideological stnpe, easily rumed agalll.St its 
original normative commitments. 
MODERN CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE AGE O F INCOH ERENCE 
Richard Nixon's viaory in the presidential elcaion of 1968 marke:! the beginning 
of the end of the rights revolucion. With the nation gripped by urban riots and anti-
war protests, Nixon blamed the Court- and its civil liberties ruling1 in particular -
for fo>tcring a general spirit of lawlessness. Nixon's fellow Republican, Ronald 
Reagan, who was elected president in 1980, directed similar co1nplaints at the 
Court. By the early r98os, the rise of the Christian Right had expanded the list of 
conservative grievances. In addition to attacking the Courr's record on "law and 
order" quesrions, Reag;m and other prominent Republicans now promised to 
appoint justices who would roll back m:cnt rulings on school prayer, abortion, 
and pomography. 
RepublicaJIS would win six of seven presidential contests berween 1968 and 
1988. Control of rhe White House provided Republican Pres denrs with an 
opportunity to ·emake the Coun in their party's image, much as FDR and the 
Dcmocr11ts had done in the late 19 JOS and early 194os. 17 The emergence in the 
19705 of a conservarive legal movemem provided the intellccrual foundation for 
this effon.81 Many of the movement's early leaders, including Rohen Bork and 
Edwin Meese, attacked the Warren Coun for 1gnonng the ongmal intenr (or 
meaning) of the Constitution's text - noting, for example, that the phrase "right 
to privacy" appears nowhere in the documem. Others foresaw that Warren-era 
civil libcrries principles might be applied to conservative ends, such as 
weakeni ng corporate transparency laws and rolling back ca mpa ign finance 
regulations. As corporate attorney and future Supreme Coun justice Lewis 
Powell explained in an inllue111ial 1971 memo, reformers on the left had long 
ago learned that an "activist Court" was potentia lly "the most importam 
instrumcni [in our constitutional system) for social, economic and political 
change.• It was high time that the nation's corporations applied this lesson in 
defense of "the free enrerprise system. "89 
•l' Bqpnrung wuh 1\i:iron•s 1969 nomin:arion of Warrm Burger to rcplxc: F..o1rf W:1rrm as Cliiel 
J~ Rcpubhan Prcsidrnts would fill rm consecutive vxancin on rhc: \,.()an. 
" Th< OfWn> ol 1ht ""'1S<n1DV< kpl mcmmmt""' cfuam<d m s....,. M. Tcl:s, TINr Riu of the 
~t""' l..;•I Mex""'"''' The Batt/, for Conlrol of th. l..dru (Pri.-=nn, Prin=on 
Unh·trAlf Psu~ 1011); Amanda Hollis~Brusky, ltlni.s with Conuqunras: The Federalist 
Soat.ry 11"'11b1 Consnvatii~ CoNnlnrevolMJion {NC'w York: Oxford Univrn.'ity Press, 201st; 
Ken L Ktrsch, • Ecumen~aJjsm through Constitutionalmn: The l>iscursivt- De .. ·dop-ment of 
Constirutional Co1iservallsm in National Reu;eu1, 1955-1980, .. S1udi~s ;,, American Political 
Dev~lopment is {1011): 86-116. 
'" The Powell Memo can be read online at: hup:lllaw1.wlu.cdu/dcpcimagcs/Powell%10Archives 
/PowcllMcmorondumTypcsc.ripc.pdf. 
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rifying and confirming judicial nominees willing ro undo .th~ War~en 
'• legacy proved more difficult than expected. Yer, begmnmg w1.th 
's 1969 nomination of Warren Burger to replace Earl Warren as Chief 
rhc arril'lll of a series of Republican appoinrces began to transform the 
·~ideological orientation. By the 198os, the Court was beginning to steer 
·tunonal doo.ttine in directions that componcd with key Reptblican policy 
_ from wL-akeniog che regulatory state to rC<>conng authoril! to state and 
governments to restricting access to abortion. But j.ust is the ri~ts 
ution did nor sweep away everything that came before u, the Republican 
ancy did rot bring about the complete dissoh~tion. of Wa~ren-e~a. civil 
·cs doctrine. Instead, it ushered in a period of bitter 1dcolo@1cal d1v1s1on, 
the justices clearly divided into "conservative" a?d "liberal" blocs .. If the 
rvativc bloc has preva iled more often than the liberal, mrernal d1v1s1ons 
within the conservative ranks have nonetheless foredosed the possibility of a 
ro the constitutional arrangements of the nineteenth century. And, 
conservative members of the Burger ( 1969- 1986), Rehnquist (r986-
aoos>.'and Roberrs (:z.005-) Courts have at time~ openly embraced ~a~ren·era 
ciW hbe"ies doctrines, even as they ha•c exploited that frameworks mtemal 
9111ion~ and app ied its core principles to radically new ends. . . . 
At the risk of oversimplification, it is possible to trace three d1sttnct lines of 
lkftlopment in che Rehnquist and Robcru Couns' major civil liberties 
decision~. The first consistS of the surprismgly small number of areas where 
..... C'A>un has sutccssfully rolled back - or at leasr limited the influence of -
Warren-era civil liberties principles. The second consists of the surprisingly 
llqpe number of cases where the Court, amng very much. in che spirit of the 
lights rcvolurion, has extended •peech and privacy protccnons to ~over novel 
suations and previously marginalized groups of Americans. The :bird consists 
oE cases where th~ Court has advanced conscrvarivc policy goals not by rolling 
blck Warren-era protections but by using innovntivc interpretations of civil 
liberties provisions to dismantle the previous regime's handiwork. 
As an example of the first line of cases, consider the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Court>' rulings in the area of ch11rch~tate relations. Beginning in the early 198os, 
die Coun rejected Establishment ClaU>C challenges to a series of scate and local 
pn>l!l"ams that indirectly funded religious activities; examples inckded state taX 
wrirc-offs for religious educational expend1rures and school voucher programs 
dult offset the c~t of attending parochial i.choob.9° Although th= programs 
dearly nccrcd public funds to religious entities, a bare majoriry of the Cou" 
NISOncd that any aid to religion resulted from the voluntary decisions of private 
Clliuns and thus did ooc constitute an official "cstahli<Jimcnt" of religion. 
V-cd collccrively, these decisions dearly eroded rhc Warren-era "wall of 
1epara11on." At no point, however, did the Coon's conservacivc majority 
dittcriy repudiate the landmark mid-century church-state prtttdents. Rather, it 
.,. Muelk:r v. Allen, 463 U.S. 31'lJ (19l'3J; 7..clman v. Simmons·! tarrls, SJb U.S. 6;9 (2001). 
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proceeded by building upon or reinforcing ducttinal ve>tigc> v( 1hc old order that 
had survived the "righis revolution" intact. 
The Court's 1970 ruling in Walz v. Tax Commission proved particularly 
useful in this regard. If tax exemptions for rclogiou~ institutions did not run 
afoul of the F.stablishment Clause, the argument went, then why should similar 
exemptions for intl1vrduals pose First Amendment problems? Had noc Walt 
definitively rejected the strict scparationist position "that any program which in 
some manner aids an instimtion with a religious affiliation violares the 
Establishment Clause"?" Moreover, the amount of money that flowed to 
religious entities as the indirect result of individual cax write-offs and school 
voucher programs paled in comparison to the financia l windfall bestowed by 
the \Volz decision. Seen in this light, the newer programs were not "atypical of 
existing govemmem programs" that had survived even Justice Hugo Black's 
exacting scruriny.!i'~ 
Jn the case of abortion, the Court has mostly stayed above the fray, leaving stare 
and lower federal COurtS ro sort out the question of whether particular forms of 
regulation are so onerous as to viola re a woman's right to rc""inate a prcgnancy.9 ' 
As a r:csult, a patdiworl< system of regulation h.,, emerged, with access to abortion 
servi= varying widely from state to State. In jurisdictions where the lower COUrtS 
have upheld innovati•e restrictions - from rwenry·four-hour waiting periods to 
mandatory sonogram procedures 10 laws requiring that abortion providers ha•-c 
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital -it has become difficult, if nor impossible, 
for women ro avail themselves of the constitutional right to terminare a pregnancy 
in its early stages. But while some pushback was certainly to be expected in lighc of 
the Republican party's >raunch opposition to abortion, the movement to restrict 
access could hardly have proceeded so smoothly absent the Roe majority's decision 
to ( 1) frame the issue in the language of medical privacy and ( 1) adopt a balancing 
approach to health and safety regulacious. Like che landmark mid-ceurury 
Establislunenc Clause decisions, in other words, Roe left in place significant 
vestiges of the rraditional regulatory structure, which in tum provided abortion 
oppont-nrs with convenient launching points for anacks on the underlying 
constitutional right.94 
•• M..tkt w. Alkn, •'J U.5 388, 191 (1983). 
•• .Ulman'- ~unmom-Huns, n' U.S. 639, '65. 668 (•001). O'Connor, J., concurring. 
"' lbt rmf(W'tXcqKM>n 11 GO#'Uk:s v. C.arban-.1n whKh a bare nu,onryo( the Coun uphdd a statt 
ban°" p1r11•l·l»nh abomons. sso U.5. t 4 (J.0071. 
"
4 Stpuftc.antly. rhr Coun It June l.Ot6 in\-":11.ic:bt:rd~ hr a vote of s-J· I Tex.as bw ttquiring that 
docron prrfcw-ming aborrons have admitting pri,'ilegcs at nearby hoq:>tu.ls and also that abor-
uon pm~c" undcrf.akc :osrl)' upgrades to their existing lxalma:. Opponmts of the measure 
observed thac more ch2n ialf of the state's abortion dini~ had dUk'd within two feari of the 
law'$ pa .. u..ge, leaving 50rnc Texas rn:idents as much as soo nulC'$ from tht nearest aboction 
pro"·ickr. A mijoriry of tht Coun, in an opinion by Ju~tioe .6reyer, found thal lhe medjcal benefits 
of t.hc 1.•hallcngcd prO\!isions, if any, were uol outwei&hed by the burdens imposed on women 
&«kin" abortiomi. It rema ns undt'ar, however, whether the decision s1gnal.s a btoader shift away 
fto.m th• Court'" ttet>nt pt>tctice o( de(e.rtiug to n:ne lawm11ktn and thf' low~r rouru Wholl" 
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Ill• second line of cases, che c.Aurt has carried on the legac_y of the. Warren 
embracing boch the doctnnal substance and normative spmt of the 
' rk 196os civil libertit-s decisions. Some of rht resulring decisions 
bly comport with conservative policy preferences. For example, in the 
1990s, ac a time wbeu many conservatives were abrmed by the rise of 
s spttch codes, the Court found that the First Amendment generally 
udts the criminalization of hate speech, abscnr a ;pecilic thrcac ro an 
ri6able individual." Other decisions, however, have cut against the 
rvative grain. Thus, the Court bas recently srruck down a number of 
~ and federal laws designed :o restrict access ro viole~~ or pornographic 
lllCfia concent and video games.• And, perhaps most surpnsmgly, the Court Ill 
1,t11vrmce v. Texas (2003) struck down a state-level criminal ban on sodomy, 
tlllll extending the right to privacy to cover same-sex inrimacy.97 
At the level of doctrine, these decisions are firmly roo:ed in the great mid· 
llDIUTY free spttch and privacy precedents. B111 d0ctrine alone cannot explain 
w1iy rhe Court, in these particular ca.cs, elected to adv~nce the legacy of the 
risbn revolution. A fuller expl"":auon would ~ by noung ~t many of these 
_., 10 conrra<r to the abortton and church-stare cases, involve fo""s of 
,...Urory authority that were thoroughly discredited during the heyday of the 
Wancn Court. In che case of free spcxch, three decades of First Ameodmeot 
~ insisting upon the viewpoint neutrality of sptteh regulations had by the 
... nf rh~ C.ourt's rightward shih effectively stripped stares and localities of the 
tbiliry 10 discriminate for or againsc particular speakers, even when the speakers 
or ideas in question are reviled by mainstream society.98 To be sure, obscene 
lpeech remained theoretically beyond the scope of First Amendment protection, 
llul this category had been narrowed almosc to oblivion: works that did not 
depict explicit sexual acts or that possessed some semblance of " literary, artistic, 
political or sciemific value" were by the late 1970s beyond the reach of the 
mison.99 Any artempt to revive the govermnent's traditional role in policing 
public discouri>e would have involved far more than ovenuming a single 
wayward precedent; it would have meant uprooting a doctrinal framework 
diat had been conscructcd over several decades and char appeared co enjoy 
1ll'C>1Nn°s H .. lrhv. Hdkr=dt, 579U.S. (101'1; .MaiyTwou, "Only £11luOinics Exp«tt<I 
to Sum¥< Rurmg, •Th. Alutin CbTOnick, Junt u., 101 s • 
., R.A. V. v. Ciry C)f 5<. P•ul, 505 U.5, J77 (1991); abo ttt V1111n1• •. Block, 538 U.S. HJ (•oo,). 
.. lltno v. Am<rian C.MI Libcni<s Union, su U.S. 844 ( 1997); A•hcrol< v. Frtt Spttch Coalition, 
!)l U.S.114 (1001l;Asbcro& v. Arueri<aoOvd J 1bcni<S Union, 511IL~. 656(?.004); Brown•· 
Entcrtaanment Merchants Association, s64 U.S._ (1011); Unirtd Stnn v. Stevens, ss9 U.S. 
(1010). 
" Uwrtnce v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (1003). 
,. Tha11 po1nf was driven home by the Seventh Circuit'!! 1 sn8 <lecisioo upholdjng rht right of 
Amtriain Nail Parcy members to m3rch through t.hc heavily Jewish t ndave of Skokte, Illinois. 
('..(')llin "· Smirh, J78 F.'ld n 97 (r978). 
" Milici "· C:.lifo111i-., 1 •;,; U.S. 1) ( 1 'l!J); Jcnl...i.1u "· Ocvtg.i"• 4 t8 U.S ISJ (I,74}. 
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broad public support - at least in che abstract. In this area, where doctrinal 
vestiges were few and far berween, even the Court's most conservative members 
have generally embraced the inherited framework, and even in the most 
conrroversia I of cases. ' 00 
To be sure, the Rehnquist Court narrowly affirmed the conscirucionality of 
state-level sodomy bans as late as 1986. Bur the more important point to note 
about the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick is that a generally conservative 
Court c.1me within a single vote of extending constitutional protection to same-
sex intimacy at a time when many in the Republican party viewed homosexuality 
as a dire 1hrcnt to the moral and physical health of the nation. ' 0 ' The 5-4 
decision, with two Republic.1n appoimees in 1he majority a nd a third only 
narrowly dissuaded from joining them, testified to the difficulty of reconciling 
sodomy prosecutions with the major privacy precedents of the 1960s and 
r97os. ' 0 " If the Court's earlier rulings had found that private, consensual, 
noncommercial sexual conduct was generally beyond the reach of the state, it 
was difficult to see why homosexual conduct should be excluded from the scope 
of the rule. Moreover, by the r98os, it was clear tha1 laws prohibiting sodomy, 
like the earlier bani. on contraception, were enforced only rarely and often in an 
arbitrary and vindictive man.nt"r. ' 0 3 As in Crirwold, a strong case could be made 
tha1 desuetude principles alone provided sufficient grounds for an opinion 
invalidating the nation's anti-sodomy laws.'"" That Bowers was overruled only 
scvenreen years after it was handed down was due in no small part 10 the cffons 
of the many acrivisis who, in the intervening years, buih a constirutioo.al case for 
rever~I and cultivated public support for decriminalizarion.'0 ' But it surely does 
these acrivim no disservice to suggesr that rhey were aided by the gradual 
erosion, over the preceding four decades, o f the states' powers of morals police. 
•i» Jn Ashcroft v. Pree Speech Coalition, for example, the C..:ourt s1n.1ck down pcovisious o( the 
ChiJJ 1,ornogNphy t>~vcution At:t o{ l 996 (Cl1JlAt that prohibited '"any visual depicdon, 
including any phocoivap~ 61nlt video, picture, or computer or oompmcr-gener.ned image or 
picture• that .. i,, or appta.tS to bt, of a minor engaging in Stxually explicit conduct."' The Court 
found 1ha1 the language was overbtoad and would pocenri1illy apply to wortcs of "'serious 
littrary. arhstic:, pohucal, or sciennfic: vatue." sn U.S. 134. 1.46 (1.001}. A revised child 
pomocnphr bw was upb<ld in U.S. v. Williams. sn U.S. 18s 11001>. 
'
0
' • 71U.S. 18' (1,S6). 
•o.1 Jusnce l.t'W'tl Powell. a N1'<on appointct; origirulty vored to Rnke down the sodomy bw at 
iuw 1n Bown$ but later rcTCrscd his vocc. PC)'Wrll brr:r cxpt'C'Sed rtgrd Fm his dcrisioo to join. 
!he-.... maJC)r>ty. Dale Carpcnn:r, Flagram \"""'"a'~ Sl<Wyof l.owmou •· Ta.u {?'tw 
York: Nonon, .ion), u J· 
·~ Sec, for ex1mple, C.arpcntcr, Flagrant Conduct, J-l.j. 
•o.+ For the argumc:nt that the Lawr"nc"' majority's opinion - and the Coun'• privacy jurisprudeoet: 
more gcnc-n.tlly - has bttn shaped by the principle of dttuctudt, see Cass R. Swisttin, •What 
Did Lawrence t lold? Of Auronomy, Desuetude-, Stxualiry, and M11rriagt," University of 
Chicago Law 0- E.conomia, Olin Working Paper 196 (ioo3), <Wi111:iblc onUnt ~t wwYdsw 
. uc h ic:-ago.edulfildlfilesl 1? 6 .crs_. la wtt11ce. pdf. 
•0 ~ Carpenter, JJ/agrant Concfua, .1.4-,)0, IS4-?9· 
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lur it is the third line of cases that is perhaps the most interesting. In cases 
g corporate speakers, rhe Burger, Rehnquist, and RobertS Courts have 
iastically embraoed the ideals of unfettered public discourse and personal 
> that undergirded so much of the mid-century Court's civil liberties 
nee. But instead of wielding rbcsc ideals in the sernce of a m<)rc 
an society, i1 has used them to dismantle key features of the regulatory 
• The first signs of a shift came in Virginia Sl4te Board of Pharmacy v. 
Citizens Consumer Co,.ncil (1976), when the Court extended First 
ment protection to commercial speech. Lf one purpose of the First 
ment was to promote rhe "societa l interest in the fullest possible 
ination of information," then the Court could sec no reason why 
kers should be stripped of constitutional protectiori merely because the 
rrnation they hoped to convey was commercial in nature. ' °" On this point, 
Court's remaining liberals agreed with the recent Republican appointees: the 
· -ccnrury Court had erred when it permitted lawmakers tO restrict speech 
yon the basis of ics commercial contcn1. 
Sharp disagreements arose, however, when the Court began ro consider the 
pease extent of corporate and commercial First Amendment rights. At bottom, 
*rift concerned the relationship between civil liberties and c-conomic power. 
.. ca~ involving corporate speakers, the Court's conservative justic.es rended 
• ircat the: marketplace and autonomy ideals as absrracr commands: more 
lflCCh was always better than less, regardless of who was speaking; and 
.-reed spccch was always consriruriooally problcmaric, even when the carger 
tlfcotrc1on was a corporation and even when 1hc: information in question was 
4'monstrably crue. In contrast, the Court's liberals 1ended 10 adhere to the 
Warttn-era view that civil liberties principles were nor to be interpreted in ways 
.., reinforced structural Oa ws in the narion 's representative system of 
pernment. 
In Fim Nalional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ( 1978), for example, a bare majority 
GlllliSting entirely of Republican appointees Struck down a Massachusetts law 
.. , banned corporations from attempring to influence ballot initiatives "unless 
*corporation's business interests were directly involved." Relying heavily on the 
-itcrplace metaphor, justice Lewis Powell's majority opinion declared that "the 
illicttnt worth of ... spctth in terms of its capacity for informing the public" was 
-'kctcd by "the identify of its source, whether corporation, association, union, 
ar indn idual. """ In contrast, three Democratic appointees and William 
llbnquist, a Nixon appointee, would h3'e held th.u the law was a permissible 
... <'.tntt•l Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pubfo: Sttv1cc Commission, .,. .... , U.S. ;57, 56.i (1980). 
Heni.:fforth,. factually ac:c:urate com.r:ntrc1al spe«:h involvms l:awful activity would bt con.niru· 
Uon;11Jy protected, unless the stare could dt:monsrmte that the chalkngrtl rtgulatlon "ditecdy 
advanced• a •substantial government intcrc!f .. and W<l'I "not more extensive than necessary ro 
tervc that imtttSl."' 
., F1n1 N111ional Bank of Boscon v. Bellotri. 43.5 U.S. 7~5. 777 (1978). 
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means of preventing corporations from dominaring the airwavc'S and directing 
shareholder mor>ey to political causes that were only tangcntiaUy related to th., 
corporation's bottom line. Far from distoning public discourse, Massachusetts 
was attempting to preserve the historic "role of the Hrst Amendment as a 
guaranror of a fr« marketplace of ideas."'"" 
Although the Bellott; majority found that the First Amendmem protected the 
right of corporations tu influence elections, the precise scope of chis right was 
left undefined. Some language in the opinion suggested that regulations 
narrowly targeted at the avoidance of corruption (or irs appearance) would 
survive first Amendment scrutiny. And a subsequent 1990 decision upheld a 
state law thar barred corporations from using treasury funds (as opposed to 
political action committee funds) for political purposes. •09 As a result, an 
uneasy truce held for the next three decades. Under the federal Election 
Campaign Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BC RA), the size of 
direct contr ibutions to candidates, parties, and political action committees was 
limited, and corporate and union expenditures were channeled through 
political action committees. Independent expenditures were also subject to 
rules designed to prevent corporations and unions from circumventing 
contribution limits by cutting ads on behalf of specific candidates. 
The mice collapsed in 1oo6, however, following the death of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor. Following the 
confirmation of John Roberts and Samuel Aliro, respectively, to fill the 
resulring vacancies, it became clear that a bare majority of the Coun now 
favored dismantling m<>St remaining restriction.• on corporate electoral activity. 
The moot signilic:int blow to the campaign finance regime came in 1010, when a 
bare majority held in Citizens United v. Federal f./ections Commission that the 
First Amendment protects the right of corporations t0 spend unlimited amounts 
from their corporate treasuries to influence campaigns, provided they do not 
coordinate their expenditures with a particular candidate. " 0 As in Bellotti, the 
marketplace metaphor ttndergirded much of the majority opinion. According to 
Justice Kennedy, laws restricting political spending by corporations dismrtcd the 
ideological marketplace by depriving average Americans of information they 
might want or need to bear. To be sure, corporarions possessed the capacity ro 
dominate the airwa»cs in ways that average citiuns could never hope to match. 
l\ut 1~1s fact was irrel~ant sit11;e, 1mder the marketplace theory, the public could 
be counted on t0 i.cp;tratt the wheat from the chaff.''' 
1°' ibid. it 810- Whnt. j .• chssenung. 
1°' Autnn v. Mteh.pn Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 651. (1990). 
"° C1rixns Un1rcd v. Federal fk:crion Commission, HI U.S. po (1010). 
II I ss• U.S. 3 ro It - (2010). '"'By suppressing chc 'ipe«h of . •. C0'1'0rlt1C'.>M, .. Kennedy wroce. 
"'the C".ovcrnmcnt prcwnti(sl their voices and viewpoints from "aching the public and ad'lising 
voccrs on which pcrloon!I ot'c:ntitiesarc hostile to their intere$U .. , f1ctiom 1hould be checked by 
ptrmining rhcm :all tn .speak1 and by entrusting the people rC> judge wh1u is trut and what is 
f:alsc.'" A subM:qucnt lower court decision, folJowing Citiuns U11i1ed tO its logic11J conclusion, 
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1be impact of the Court's corporate speech dcci,ions was not confined to the 
of campaign finance. Following Virginia Board and Bell-01ti, the number of 
Amendment challenges co corporate transparency and disclosure laws 
eml - as did the odds of success. In recent years, roughly half of all 
Amendment decisions handed down at the federal appellate level have 
ed business corporations and trade groups a~ opposed to individuals and 
· 'onal exprcssi»c assodations. •u More to the point, the resulting decisioos 
cut to the very core of the regulatory sratt. To list but a few exampks, 
tions have successfully advanced First Amendment speech challenges to 
prohibiting the buying and selling, without consent, of patient prescription 
by data mining and pharmaceutical companies,''> regulations requiring that 
kh claims used to market food products be supported by at least 
"'° randomly comrolled trial srudies,',. regulations requiring companies to 
osc their use of "conflict minerals,""' and regulations requiring t0bacco 
tlJlllpanies to display graphic warning lahcl• on packs of cigarettes. " 6 
The autonomy principle and the corollary prohibition against compelled speech 
liPe proved particularly useful in chis reg.1rd. In its opinion upholding the right o f 
..i-xo companies to refuse to incl ode graphic warning labels on their products, for 
.-nplc, the D.C. Circuit held that "any am.-mpc by the government to compel 
lldMduals to . . . subsidize speoch to which they object" was subject to stria 
lllU!iny. 1lns rule applied e.-en when the speech an qucstioo invol,.ed "statements 
fll fa..i the speaker would rather a,·oid" and regardless of whether the speakers in 
~ were individuals or corporanons.'" A bare maionty of the Supmne Court 
mdoncd a similar argument in Harris v. Q1111111 (1014), a potentially far-reaching 
41ecision mva~dating a "fair share" agreement that required publicly subsidi7,ed 
lionic health care workers to contribute to the costs of union representation. " 8 
Jreaking with a long line of precedent that include-cl T11t<'T1Mtumal Associa!ion of 
"#IM*inis~ v. Street, the Tlarris majority found lhal, although the collective 
t-rgaining system in question furthered legirimate state interests, these interei.'ts 
_.. not sufficient to overcome the Firsr Amc11dmcnt rights of employ<"<"S who 
objected to paying union dues. To hold otherwi!>C would be to violate the principle 
kid that the Fm.'t Ammdmdu- prottt"l1 tbt nght or ITil('fHI groups and political acrion 
C'OUWUllC'O tor~ unlimittd amounts oi monty, PfO"tdcd. agam, that rhcy do nor c.oordirur.r 
thtu upmd,1um wUli a puticu]ar candoda<t. Spttch-.:ow.org .-. FF\, ;99 F.;d 6&6 (D.C. 
C".1r. 1010). 
ua John C. <.:oa1ts IV, "Corponre Spe<eh •nd me Fom i\m<ndmcnc History, Dau, and 
barloc.moos, • C,,.,,,;,,nion:Jf Comm"'r"'Y ;o ( 10 • l ): u J-76. 
"~II v. IMS Hc;ilcb, s64 U.S._(10nJ. 
'' POM Wonderful, I.LC v. FTC (D.C:. Cir. Jan. ;o, 1011). 
111 N;:a11unal A'50Ci:mon of M~tnufucturcrs v. S«uriuc'i and ExchJ.UKe Conuniss-ion, 748 F.3d 359 
ID.(.. Ci.r. i.014). The: NAM dc:cisicm was, however, ovnruled by A.tt\Cttcan Men lnstirure v. 
U'iOi\, 760 F.;d 08 (D.C. Cir. >014) (<n bane). 
••• R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Administr1111on, 696 F .Jd 1105 (0.C. Cir. ?.O T?.). 117 lb1d.atu.11. ull Harris v.Quinn1 134S.Ct.:16t8t.a.014). 
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that the government "may not prohibit the dis5eminarion of ideas that it disfavors, 
nor compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves."' " 
In decisions such as Virginia Board, Citizens Uniud, and I lams v. Quinn, the 
rcconsriruted Court has dealt a series of signilicanr blows to the rcgularory stare, 
but nOt by challenging its authority head-on. Rather, rhe Coun's conscrvati~ 
majority has conceded the legitimacy of the underlying power (e.g., to regulate 
campaign finance, to m3lldate corporate transparr-ncy, to impose collective 
bargaining arrangements}, only to rendeL regulation impractical through an 
expansive inrcrpn:tation of the First Amendment rights of individuals and 
corporations. Adding to the irony, it has done so using the very doctrines that 
the mid-century Court used to dismantle the various state and local prerogatives 
that had long relega1ed workers and minori1ies to a subordinate position in 
American society. To be sure, as Justice Aliro acknowledged in his o pinion for 
rhe Harris majority, previous Courts had repeatedly rebuffed first Amendment 
challenges tO the regulatory state. But these ea rl ier precedents were not binding 
upon rhe prese111 Court, Alico insisted, as they were the "result of historical 
accident, not careful application of principles." ' 10 
CONCLUSION 
This last remark from J usticc Alito, with its juxraposirion of "principles" and 
"historical accidems," might well serve as the epitaph for the past cenrury of 
constirurional development in the area of civil liberties. Since at least the New 
Deal period, it has been the aspiration of judges and commentators alike to 
liberate citi.ccns from arbitrary authority strucnires bequeathed by their 
forebears. During this period, constitutiona l interpreters have generally 
agreed thnt if official authority is co survive constitutional scrutiny, it should 
not be because of the judge's irrational prejudice in fovor of the familiar but 
rather because the r ights claimant has misunderstood o r missta ted the nature of 
the principle at stake - whether the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, 
or the right to privacy. The problem - and the explanation for much of the 
incoherence of recent civil liberties doctrine - is rhat the distinction between a 
"historical accident" and a proper "application of principles• often lies in the 
eye of the beholder. 
"' !71 U.S. (>014). Althoogh 1hc sp<alic boldU1gol HllmS w.u rwrowly wxned al Illinois' 
ugulition of home he-a Ith care worlcC1"5, the <kc:rseon Sttmtd to SJgtU.I the Coun's willingness to 
tt00m1<.kr the broader quc:Won of compelkd union dutt. And, 1ndttd. the Court in Marth 
101' d1~idc-d 4- '4 on tk question of whether publk sector •agency shop .. provisjoos were m 
viola11on o( the Fint Amendment. If not For Justice Scali-;a's unrimdy death iJ1 februacy1016, 
the Court almost cettautJy wouJd ha\•c handed down 11 f::tr·rcaching d«.i,ion eviscerating rhc 
crntcal Wnrren·tt<l precedents oon<..~rning unjon dues and the First Amendment. Friedrichs v. 
C.1lifornia Teachers Association, 578 U.S. _ (2016). 
'"' S73 U.S._ (io14) 
Uberties and tbe Dual Legacy of the f:o1111di11g ros 
Iii rhc •ame term that the Court decided 1/orris v. Quinn, it also deci_ded 
fell v. Hodges, a landmark decision granting same-sex couples the nght 
rry. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy and the majority found that state laws 
limircd the right to marry to opposite-sex couplos were, m effect, historical 
rs. Because the laws in question served no purpose other than to register 
randing and irrational prejudice against homosexuals, they could only be 
ri7.ed as 311 illegitimate denial of "liberty" under the Fourteenth 
cot's Due Process Clause. Although "history and tradition" were 
inly relevant to the constinitional inquiry, they did not mark the "outer 
5• o f constitutional liberry. The past, Kennedy insisted , would not be 
[edJ ... to rule the present. " 
Now on the opposite side of the "historical accident~ formulation, Justice 
failed to perceive how traditional marriage laws could be characterized as 
"trary relics of a bygone era. In a dissent joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
suAAested that rradinonal ma rriage laws served the important purpose of 
urag[ingj potentially procreative conduct to take place within a lasnng urut 
has long been thought to provide the best atmo>phcrc for raising children." 
fer from registering an irrational prejudice, existing laws embodied an inter"'"' 
... ttgarded as legitimate "in a great variety of countries and cultures all around 
* globe.• If 311yone was guilty of conflating irrationa I prejudice 3lld con-
tlilurional principle, it was Justice Kennedy and the majority. It was they, not 
- lawtndkers, who had read into "the Constitution a vision of liberty that 
liappcn!e<ll to coincide with their own." 
The core disagreement in Obergefel/ cal.ls to mind Walter Lippmann's 
wrrung, issued in the late 1910s, that Americans would increasingly find 
diemsclvcs unable to justify legal authori ty by reference 10 shared moral or 
religious principles. Lippmann was of course referring to the difficulty of 
lllforcing traditional legal prohibitions in a world that was growu1g more 
morally hercrogeneous by the day. Bur he might just as easily have formulated 
die point in the opposite way: with rhe collapse of traditional belief structures, 
apan,ively worded constirurional guara ntees - from rhe "freedom of speech" to 
die "csrablishment of religion" to "liberty" itself - would be transformed into 
highly adaptable tools that could be used to ch311cngc (or buruess) a lmost any 
am nf authority, whether public or private, national or local, old or new. To be 
~ Americans would remain free to invoke tradition as one possible locus of 
i.rrprcnve authority, but the interpretive significance of tradition was itself up 
for grabs. Whether inherited authority structures furthered legitimate ends or 
~ly reflected parochial prejudices - whether ag;iinst gays and lesbians or in 
favor of organized labor- would become increasingly a matter of opinion. j udges 
end commcntarors, for their part, would be left to search in vain "for a new 
orthodoxy into which men can retreat." 
